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TESTING THE RADICAL EXPERMIENT:. A STUDY
OF LAWYER RESPONSE TO CLIENTS WHO
INTEND TO HARM OTHERS
Leslie C. Levin*
There are many, or at least several occasions when a client
gives indications that he/she might commit[] a vio-
lent/criminal act against another person. These situations are
the toughest, most perplexing dilem[m]as that I face. In other
words, I am not reasonably convinced that the client will
definitely commit[] the act; I am reasonably convinced that
he might commit the act .... [H]ow can anyone ever be sure?
My worst fears have never been realized, but I live in dread
that they may be.'
The question of what, if anything, a lawyer should do when
confronted with a client who intends to commit a criminal or
fraudulent act that will seriously harm another is theoretically
* Associate Clinical Professor of Law and Director of the Lawyering
Process Program, University of Connecticut School of Law. Columbia
University School of Law, J.D. 1979. I would like to thank Dale Jones of
the New Jersey Public Defenders' Office for assistance in distributing the
survey instrument described in this Article. My thanks also go to Louise
Roth for statistical assistance, Steven Kaplan for comments on an earlier
draft and Peggy McKee and the staff of the New York University
Lawyering Program for their administrative support in connection with
the survey.
1. I.D. No. 193, Question A.C. (Additional Comments section). This
quote is from a comment made by a New Jersey lawyer responding to a
thirty-nine question mail survey. This survey is part of a study of how
New Jersey lawyers respond to the problem of clients who plan to cause
serious harm to others ("New Jersey study"). The survey is described in
detail infra parts IV. A. & B. Tables containing specific frequencies and
tabulations derived from the survey responses are cited in this article as
"Table _." Individual lawyers responding to the survey were assigned
coded identification numbers, and their quotes are cited in this article as
"I.D. No. _, Question ." Only those tables and survey responses quoted
in this article are on file with the Rutgers Law Review. All tables and
survey responses are on file with the author.
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challenging and as a practical matter, agonizingly difficult.
Problems begin almost immediately, with questions about
what to tell the client about the confidentiality of communica-
tions when the client's conversations turn to future criminal
plans or fraudulent pursuits. The problems multiply as the
lawyer tries to assess the likelihood that the wrongful act2 will
in fact occur and the seriousness of any harm that it might
cause.
Once these questions are answered, the lawyer must then
face the more difficult question of what to do. Efforts to con-
vince the client to abandon the plans may alienate the client
and-even worse-fail. A decision to alert the intended victim
may subject the client to prosecution, prejudice the client in
other proceedings and destroy the attorney-client relationship.
While weighing the moral-philosophical implications of disclo-
sure and non-disclosure, the attorney must also wrestle with
competing self-interested considerations. These considerations
include potential civil liability to third parties or clients,3 loss
of business and reputation, and even personal danger,4 de-
pending upon the lawyer's response to the client's plans.
Lawyers have not been left alone to struggle with their cli-
ents and their consciences. Codes of professional responsibility
and to a lesser extent, other laws, have addressed this prob-
2. The terms "wrongful act" and "wrongdoing" are used in this article
to mean a criminal, illegal or fraudulent act. It is, of course, possible
that a lawyer will learn that a client intends to take some entirely law-
ful action that will cause substantial harm to a third party. No rule or
professional responsibility code suggests that attorneys must prevent such
an action and this article focuses on wrongful acts only.
3. Clients may have a claim for wrongful disclosure of client confi-
dences. See, e.g., Alan B. Vickery, Note, Breach of Confidence: An Emerg-
ing Tort, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1426, 1461, 1464-65 (1982). In addition,
attorneys may have to contend with disciplinary proceedings. One attor-
ney stated that she has been forced to respond to disciplinary charges
that her client brought against her because she disclosed client informa-
tion to prevent harm to another. Telephone Interview with Attorney A
(June 24, 1993).
4. Attorney A, described in supra note 3, revealed a client's plans to
physically harm a witness, and is concerned about her personal safety.
She noted that even though her former client is now incarcerated, "he'll
get out" and because she lives alone she said, "I'm nervous about it."
Telephone Interview with Attorney A, supra note 3.
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lem, but they reflect competing views of how lawyers should
respond to client plans to commit wrongful acts. The "solu-
tions" run the gamut from giving lawyers wide discretion to
decide whether to disclose their clients' plans to giving them no
apparent discretion whatsoever, other than quiet disobedience
of the rules.5
The justifications for the varying approaches to the problem
are based in large part upon assumptions about how lawyers
and clients will behave when communications between lawyer
and client are treated as confidential. While much has been
written about the theoretical justifications underlying confiden-
tiality and disclosure in this context,6 little has been done to
test the underlying assumptions about how practitioners in
fact behave when confronted with clients who intend to commit
wrongful acts that will seriously harm others.7 Less is known
about whether lawyers follow the rules that address this prob-
lem or whether they make their own rules.8
5. Compare MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101
(C) (1980) (lawyer may reveal intention of a client to commit a crime)
with N.J. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b) (1985) (lawyer
must disclose when necessary to prevent criminal or fraudulent acts
likely to result in substantial harm to others) and CAL. BUS. & PROF.
CODE § 6068(e) (Deering 1993) (lawyer must maintain inviolate the confi-
dences and secrets of the client).
6. See, e.g., David J. Fried, Too High a Price for Truth: The Excep-
tion to the Attorney-Client Privilege for Contemplated Crimes and Frauds,
64 N.C. L. REV. 443, 490-98 (1986); Harry I. Subin, The Lawyer as Su-
perego: Disclosure of Client Confidences to Prevent Harm, 70 IOWA L.
REV. 1091, 1159-75 (1985); Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality,
74 IOWA L. REV. 351, 358-76 (1989); Note, Developments in the Law -
Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1450, 1501-24 (1985) [here-
inafter Developments].
7. Only two studies provide some information about lawyer conduct
in this context. KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 111-23
(1985); Zacharias, supra note 6, at 389. Neither focused primarily on this
subject.
8. Professor Susan Koniak has demonstrated how the bar's conception
of the hierarchy of rules that bind it is different than the state's vision
and that bar rules may at times be followed even when they conflict
with rules created by courts or other non-bar entities. This is particularly
true when client confidentiality is at stake. Susan P. Koniak, The Law
Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1389, 1411-47 (1992).
1994]
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To explore these questions, New Jersey lawyers were sur-
veyed to determine how they respond to clients who plan to
commit wrongful acts that are likely to substantially harm
others. New Jersey's Rules of Professional Conduct have been
called an "openly radical experiment," in part because New
Jersey was the first state to adopt a rule of professional con-
duct requiring lawyers to disclose client information to prevent
a client from committing a criminal, fraudulent or illegal act
that would seriously harm another. ° New Jersey Rule of Pro-
fessional Conduct (RPC) 1.6(b) was a radical departure from
previous bar rules, which had only permitted lawyers to reveal
client information to prevent future crimes."
Other states have followed New Jersey's lead and now re-
quire that lawyers disclose information to prevent clients from
committing certain wrongful acts that will seriously harm oth-
ers. 2 On the tenth anniversary of New Jersey's rule, it is
time to revisit the experiment to consider the workability of
mandatory disclosure rules in practice and to reflect upon what
the experiment teaches about the assumptions underlying the
rules governing lawyers when their clients plan to harm oth-
ers.
This Article considers not only mandatory disclosure rules,
but the other rules that govern attorney conduct when lawyers
are confronted with clients who intend to commit serious
wrongdoing. It begins with the rules governing lawyer confi-
9. 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF
LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCT, § AP4:104 at 1263-65 (2d ed. Supp. 1993) [hereinafter THE LAW OF
LAWYERING]. The "radical experiment" included not only the requirement
that lawyers disclose client information to prevent future crimes and
fraud, but a requirement that lawyers disclose material facts where the
tribunal may be misled by not knowing them, even if the lawyer and
client did not mislead the court. See infra notes 49, 52 and accompany-
ing text.
10. N.J. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b) (1985) [herein-
after RPC 1.6(b)].
11. See infra notes 31-37, 44-45 and accompanying text.
12. Nine other states have adopted mandatory disclosure requirements
to prevent clients from committing certain future wrongful acts. Most of
them do not go as far as RPC 1.6(b) and are limited to disclosure to
prevent death or substantial bodily harm. See infra note 55.
[Vol.47:81
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dentiality and disclosure in this context and their theoretical
justifications. It then considers the empirical support for those
rules, including the results of the New Jersey study. The New
Jersey study is only a preliminary effort to explore this area,13
but the results of the study cast doubt on some of the justifica-
tions underlying mandatory disclosure rules. The results also
suggest that more consideration must be given to what lawyers
tell clients about mandatory disclosure rules and to whether
broad disclosure rules are worth their price.
I. THE RULES GOVERNING ATTORNEYS WHEN THEIR
CLIENTS INTEND To HARM OTHERS
The laws and rules governing attorneys when they learn
that their clients are planning to commit wrongful acts consist
of a patchwork of evidentiary privilege, common law duties,
miscellaneous statutes and professional responsibility rules. To
understand lawyer response to such client plans, it is useful to
briefly identify those laws and rules, beginning with the attor-
ney-client privilege which informs so much bar tradition.
A. The Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege is too well known to warrant
extended discussion. It protects against the use of legal process
to compel disclosure of communications made in confidence by
a client to a lawyer relating to the subject of the representa-
tion." To enjoy the status of a privileged communication, the
communication must be made for the purpose of obtaining
legal advice.15
The justifications for the attorney-client privilege can be
roughly classified as rights-based and utilitarian. 6  The
13. The New Jersey study is the largest of its kind, but it is not
based on a completely random sample, see infra notes 108-12, 126 and
accompanying text, and should be viewed as a preliminary effort to ex-
plore this area.
14. 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §
2290 (McNaughton rev. 1961). See also Developments, supra note 6, at
1456 & n.10.
15. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 14, § 2292 at 554. See also Subin, supra
note 6, at 1113.
16. The justifications have also been described as "utilitarian" and
19941
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rights-based justifications relate directly to the client's privacy
and personal autonomy. 7 The utilitarian justifications are
based largely on assumptions about the benefits to the client
and to society of full and free communication between lawyer
and client. Those benefits include improved legal representa-
tion because the trust relationship between the attorney and
client encourages the client to feel free to convey all relevant
facts to an attorney. 8 In addition, clients will seek legal ad-
vice about questionable conduct and lawyers will encourage
their clients to act within the law and discourage them from
acting in violation of the law. 9
The attorney-client privilege does not protect the communi-
cations of a client who consults an attorney for advice that will
serve the client in the commission of a crime or fraud.2" The
crime-fraud exception to the privilege applies both to communi-
cations with an attorney concerning future crimes or fraud,
and communications concerning wrongful acts that are already
"non-utilitarian," Developments, supra note 6, at 1501-09; as "instrumen-
tal" and "rights-based," Subin, supra note 6, at 1159-72; and as
"deontological" and "utilitarian," Lee A. Pizzimenti, The Lawyer's Duty to
Warn Clients about Limits on Confidentiality, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 441,
444 (1990).
17. The rights-based justifications focus on the client's rights and on
the notion that the client is entitled to know the law and to obtain as-
sistance from a lawyer in dealing with a complicated legal system. See,
e.g., Subin, supra note 6, at 1160. Confidentiality also insures that the
lawyer will not make disclosures that may harm the client, effectively
disclosing a client's self-incriminating statements. For a discussion of the
relationship between the attorney-client privilege and the constitutionally-
protected right to avoid self-incrimination, see id. at 1120-34.
18. Attorneys are thought to need these communications to provide
their clients with effective representation and to produce a more just
result in the representation, which is a positive societal goal. Zacharias,
supra note 6, at 358.
19. For critiques of the rights-based and utilitarian defenses of confi-
dentiality, see Subin, supra note 6, at 1160-72; Zacharias, supra note 6,
at 359-76.
20. See Developments, supra note 6, at 1457 & n.18. Wigmore states
that "it has been agreed from the beginning" that the privilege does not
protect the client in concerting with the lawyer a crime or other evil
enterprise. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 14, § 2298 at 572. See Fried, supra
note 6, at 446-89, for general background regarding the crime-fraud ex-
ception to the attorney-client privilege.
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in progress.2' The client's intent usually determines whether
the exception applies, that is, whether the client knowingly
sought the attorney's aid in committing or concealing a crime
or fraud.22 The crime-fraud exception applies even if the attor-
ney has no knowledge of the wrongful activity.23
The exception is justified on the ground that protecting com-
munications about planned crime or fraud does not achieve the
objectives of the attorney-client privilege.24 Since there is lit-
tle societal interest in fostering client communications with a
lawyer which were made with the intent to further a crime or
fraud, the balance tips toward disclosure.
The crime-fraud exception addresses only the issue of testi-
monial compulsion-usually after wrongdoing has oc-
curred-and not the question of what an attorney should do
when faced with knowledge that a client is about to commit a
wrongful act. That question is answered to a limited extent by
case law, statutes and state professional responsibility codes.
B. Laws Requiring Disclosure to Prevent Harm to Others
Traditionally, lawyers, like the general public, have no legal
obligation to take steps to prevent a future crime or fraud.25
21. Developments, supra note 6, at 1509-10. In contrast, communica-
tions about wrongful acts that have been completed are protected by the
attorney-client privilege. Id. at 1510 n.50. See also 8 WIGMORE, supra
note 14, § 2298, at 573; THE LAW OF LAWYERING, supra note 9, §1.6:104
at 138.
22. Subin, supra note 6, at 1115. In fact, the exception seems to apply
regardless of the client's purpose when consulting the attorney, if the
client subsequently commits a crime or fraud aided by the attorney's ad-
vice. See Fried, supra note 6, at 459 & n.70. See also Developments,
supra note 6, at 1512-13.
23. Subin, supra note 6, at 1114.
24. Developments, supra note 6, at 1510. In addition, the client has no
"right" to engage in wrongful activity and no right to use a lawyer's ser-
vices to facilitate that activity. Subin, supra note 6, at 1162.
25. The law generally does not require lay persons to make disclo-
sures in order to prevent a future crime that will result in physical
harm to others. Indeed, in most states they need not take steps to pre-
vent a crime as it happens, even if it would require relatively little for
them to do so. Daniel B. Yeager, A Radical Community of Aid: A Rejoin-
der to Opponents of Affirmative Duties to Help Strangers, 71 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1, 5-8 (1993).
19941
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Courts have generally declined to impose obligations on law-
yers to prevent wrongful client acts in which the lawyers are
not involved.2" Where the lawyers knowingly lend assistance
to client wrongdoing, they will be subject to common law liabil-
ity on an agency theory for failure to disclose client informa-
tion to prevent a client from committing wrongful acts.27
Although Congress has considered imposing statutory duties
on lawyers to disclose information that may include client
confidences in order to prevent future harm to others, it has
been reluctant to do so.2 State legislatures have been only
slightly more willing to impose a duty to disclose. For example,
while lawyers in some states have an obligation to disclose
past or ongoing child abuse, few states obligate lawyers to
26. There are some individuals who have special duties to prevent
imminent physical harm because they have special relationships with the
persons who may cause harm to others. The most well-known example is
mental health professionals, who in some states have a duty to act to
prevent their patients from causing serious physical harm to others. E.g.,
Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976). Parents of
minor children, masters of their servants and persons "in charge" of
another with dangerous propensities also have special relationships giving
rise to a duty to control the conduct of another to prevent harm to third
parties. See E.L. Kellett, Annotation, Private Person's Duty and Liability
for Failure to Protect Another Against Criminal Attack by Third Person,
10 A.L.R.3d 619, 623 (1966 & Supp. 1993). These duties to take steps to
prevent serious bodily harm to a third party have not been extended to
lawyers. E.g., Seibel v. City & County of Honolulu, 602 P.2d 532 (Haw.
1979); Hawkins v. King County Dep't of Rehabilitative Servs., 602 P.2d
361 (Wash. 1979).
It is possible that in the future, courts may hold lawyers liable for
failure to prevent future harm based upon bar code obligations to dis-
close. One court has found a duty to disclose fraud based on disclosure
requirements contained in a state bar code. See Philadelphia Reserve
Supply Co. v. Nowalk & Assoc., Inc., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12745 (E.D.
Pa. Aug. 25, 1992). But see Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 492 (4th
Cir. 1991) (holding alleged violation of ethical rule did not create duty to
disclose), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1475 (1992).
27. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Lawyers and Client Fraud: They Still
Don't Get It, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 701, 706-07 (1993). As Professor
Hazard notes, client fraud may also entail accessorial civil liability for a
lawyer who is merely negligent. Id. at 707.
28. Senator Arlen Specter proposed the Lawyer's Duty of Disclosure
Act of 1983, S. 485, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). The Act never made it
out of the Senate Judiciary Committee.
[Vol.47:81
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reveal a belief about future abuse.29 Regulatory agencies such
as the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Office of
Thrift Supervision have pursued lawyers for failure to disclose
client information to prevent serious financial injury, but they
have not done so where the lawyers were not allegedly assist-
ing the wrongful activity." Lawyers confronted with clients
who are contemplating future wrongdoing must often look to
their consciences and to the applicable state codes of profes-
sional responsibility to decide what to do.
C. Professional Responsibility Codes
1. The ABA Codes
Prior to 1983, the ABA bar codes required lawyers to main-
tain client confidences, but permitted them to disclose the
intention of a client to commit a crime.3' Lawyers were not
permitted to reveal a client's intention to commit a non-crimi-
nal fraud, although they were required to reveal a fraud or
29. See generally Robert P. Mosteller, Child Abuse Reporting Laws
and Attorney-Client Confidences: The Reality and the Specter of Lawyer
as Informant, 42 DUKE L.J. 203, 217-21, .244-55 (1992).
30. See generally Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Lawyer Liability in Third
Party Situations: The Meaning of the Kaye Scholer Case, 26 AKRON L.
REv. 395, 400-06 (1993); Richard M. Phillips, Client Fraud and the Secu-
rities Lawyer's Duty of Confidentiality, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 823, 827
(1992).
31. Canon 37 announced the "duty of a lawyer to preserve his client's
confidences," but explicitly permitted an attorney to disclose the an-
nounced intention of a client to commit a crime. See CANONS OF PROFES-
SIONAL ETHICS Canon 37 (1928).
The ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility, which was
adopted in some form by virtually every state, permitted lawyers to re-
veal "the intention of a client to commit a crime and the information
necessary to prevent the crime," regardless of the seriousness of the
crime. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C) (1970)
[hereinafter CPR]. Although the official footnotes to the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility suggested that a lawyer was required to make dis-
closure to prevent crimes under certain circumstances, Professor Hazard
has suggested, probably correctly, that in practice it was generally un-
derstood that only "serious" crimes qualified for disclosure and that there
was no mandatory disclosure requirement even in serious cases. See THE
LAW OF LAWYERING, supra note 9, §1.6:302 at 165.
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perjury that had already occurred in the course of the repre-
sentation. 2
In the late 1970's, the ABA's Kutak Commission, which was
charged with drafting new proposed Model Rules of Profession-
al Conduct, prepared a Discussion Draft requiring disclosure of
client information to prevent substantial bodily harm to anoth-
er. This proposal provoked such controversy"3 that the Kutak
Commission ultimately recommended in its Proposed Final
Draft that attorneys be permitted to disclose client confidences
when necessary to prevent a client from committing a criminal
or fraudulent act that was likely to result in substantial bodily
harm or injury to the financial interest or property of anoth-
er.
34
32. See CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canons 29, 41 (1937). Sub-
sequent ABA ethics opinions significantly eroded the force of the disclo-
sure requirements set out in Canons 29 and Canon 41 based on the
perceived importance of maintaining client confidences. See Koniak, supra
note 8, at 1431-34.
When the ABA adopted the Model Code of Professional Responsi-
bility it included in DR 7-102(B)(1) the requirement that lawyers disclose
information to avoid a fraud or perjury on a person or tribunal that
occurred in the course of the representation. In 1974, the ABA amended
Rule 7-102(B) to add that disclosure must be made unless the informa-
tion was protected as a "privileged communication." This exception virtu-
ally eliminated the disclosure obligation. Many states, including New Jer-
sey, did not adopt this amendment. E.g., N.J. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(B)(1) (1983).
33. The controversy began in earnest in August 1979 when Professor
Monroe Freedman, an outspoken proponent of strict confidentiality, dis-
closed to the press the Kutak Commission's Discussion Draft, which re-
quired lawyers to disclose client confidences in order to prevent death or
serious bodily harm and permitted disclosure to prevent or rectify a "de-
liberately wrongful act." See Ted Schneyer, Professionalism as Bar Poli-
tics: The Making of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 14 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 677, 702 (1989). In response, the American Trial Lawyers'
Association began to draft an alternative code. The Kutak Commission
ultimately dropped the proposal concerning mandatory disclosure. Id. at
710-12.
34. The Proposed Final Draft Rule 1.6(b) stated in part that a lawyer
may reveal information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes nec-
essary:
(2) to prevent the client from committing a criminal or fraudu-
lent act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in death or
substantial injury to the financial interest or property of another;
[Vol.47:81
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The ABA House of Delegates declined to adopt the Kutak
Commission's proposal."5 Instead, in early 1983, the ABA
adopted an amendment to Rule 1.6 which narrowed the discre-
tion previously left to lawyers by permitting an attorney to
reveal client information only to the extent necessary to pre-
vent a client from committing criminal acts likely to result in
imminent death or substantial bodily harm.3" Lawyers were
not permitted to reveal the intention of a client to commit
criminal or fraudulent acts likely to result in substantial finan-
cial injury or property damage. 7
The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct have been
adopted in some form in the majority of the states.' Although
it made some significant modifications, New Jersey was the
first state to consider and adopt some form of the Model Rules.
(3) to rectify the consequences of a client's criminal or fraudulent
act in the commission of which the lawyer's services had been
used.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (Proposed Final Draft
1981).
35. During the February 1983 mid-year meeting, following a heated
debate, the American College of Trial Lawyers offered an amendment to
Model Rule 1.6 which by a 207-109 vote eliminated those provisions of
Rule 1.6(b) which permitted lawyers to disclose the intention of a client
to c6mmit "fraudulent" acts or to disclose client information in order to
prevent substantial injury to the financial interest or property of another.
See ELAINE REICH, ABA CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, THE
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT:
THEIR DEVELOPMENT IN THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 48 (1987).
36. Model Rule 1.6(b) provides that a lawyer may reveal information
to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the
lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substan-
tial bodily harm.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (1983).
37. The only disclosure that could be made concerning client fraud ap-
peared in Model Rule 3.3, entitled "Candor Toward the Tribunal," which
provided that a lawyer shall not knowingly fail to "disclose a material
fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting" a
client's criminal or fraudulent act. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(2)(1983).
38. At least 35 states have adopted some form of the Model Rules.
THE LAW OF LAWYERING, supra note 9, § AP4:101 at 1255. Model Rule




2. New Jersey's Rules of Professional Conduct: The Radical
Experiment
In July 1982, in the midst of the controversy surrounding
the Kutak Commission's proposals, the New Jersey Supreme
Court appointed a committee to recommend whether the ABA's
proposed Model Rules should be adopted in New Jersey.39 The
following year, the Debevoise Committee" proposed that Mod-
el Rule 1.6 be revised to require an attorney to disclose client
information if necessary to prevent the client from committing
a criminal or fraudulent act likely to result in death or sub-
stantial bodily injury.4 It also recommended that a lawyer be
permitted to reveal information to prevent criminal or fraudu-
lent acts likely to result in substantial injury to the financial
interest or property of another.42
This proposed rule went even farther than the highly contro-
versial Kutak Commission's Proposed Final Draft, which had
been rejected a few months earlier by the ABA House of Dele-
gates. Perhaps because of this controversy, the Committee felt
compelled to note in its report that the Kutak proposal was "by
no means [a] radical departure[] from New Jersey's present
Disciplinary Rules. "' 3In fact, the Debevoise Committee's own proposal concerning
disclosure of future client wrongdoing was something of a "rad-
ical departure" from the existing rules. Although New Jersey's
then-existing professional responsibility rules permitted law-
yers to reveal the intention of a client to commit a crime,"
39. See Report of the New Jersey Supreme Court Committee on the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 112 N.J. L.J. 93 (Supp. 1983).
40. The 20-person committee, chaired by United States District Court
Judge Dickinson R. Debevoise, was comprised largely of the mainstream
New Jersey legal establishment. The Committee included four judges,
three law professors, one law school dean, a vice president of the New
Jersey State Bar Association, the president of Legal Services Corporation,
and two prominent non-lawyers. Report, supra note 39, Supp. at 1 (1983).
41. See Report, supra note 39, Supp. at 10 (1983).
42. The Committee's recommendation mirrored the balance of the
Kutak Commmision's Proposed Final Draft Rule 1.6, including that disclo-
sure be permitted to rectify the consequences of a client's wrongful acts
in the furtherance of which the lawyer's services had been used. Id.
43. Id at 9.
44. N.J. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C) (1983).
[Vol.47:81
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never before had there been any requirement that an attorney
disclose a client's intention to commit a crime, no matter how
heinous. Moreover, New Jersey's existing rules did not permit
lawyers to reveal a client's future plans to commit non-criminal
fraud.45
The Committee sought to bolster its recommendation by
relying upon New Jersey Supreme Court pronouncements that
when balancing the conflicting principles of full disclosure
versus confidentiality, "public policy demands that full disclo-
sure is the more fundamental principle."' The Committee
also reasoned that "any step less than acceptance by the bar of
proposed Rule 1.6 will diminish the public's esteem for the
legal profession." 7 Due possibly in part to concern about the
public's particularly low opinion of lawyers at that time, the
New Jersey State Bar Association endorsed the Committee's
mandatory disclosure proposal. 8
45. At that time, New Jersey's Code of Professional Responsibility
required disclosure of client fraud only when the lawyer learns the "cli-
ent has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a
person or tribunal." N.J. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-
102(B)(2) (1983).
46. Report, supra note 39, Supp. at 10 (1983). The Committee cited In
re Kozlov, 398 A.2d 882 (N.J. 1979) and In re Richardson, 157 A.2d 695
(N.J. 1960). It is not surprising that the balance was struck in favor of
disclosure in those cases, since they involved communications that fell
within the well recognized crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client
privilege. There were not, however, any prior opinions which required
lawyers to disclose the intention of their clients to commit a crime.
47. Report, supra note 39, Supp. at 10 (1983). The Committee had
good reason to be concerned about the public's esteem given the bad
press that lawyers were receiving at that time. In 1983, the OPM case
was in the news, the ABA's Model Rules were receiving mixed reviews
and a Gallup Poll revealed that the public rated funeral directors as
having higher ethical standards than lawyers. E.g., Stephen P. Doyle et
al., Trustee's Criticism of Lawyers in O.P.M. Imbroglio, LEGAL TIMES,
May 2, 1983, at 20; Stephen Gillers, Lawyers' Silence: Wrong . . . , N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 14, 1983, at A17; Honesty and Ethical Standards--Overview,
GALLUP OPINION INDEX 4 (1983).
48. See New Jersey State Bar Association Special Committee on Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, Report on the Proposed Model Rules of
Professional Conduct 2, 4 (Dec. 9, 1983) (copy on file with the Rutgers
Law Review).
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When the New Jersey Supreme Court adopted its new Rules
of Professional Conduct in 1984, it took the Debevoise
Committee's recommendations two steps farther. RPC 1.6(b)
required that an attorney disclose information necessary to
prevent a client from committing a criminal, fraudulent or
illegal act that is likely to result in death or substantial bodily
harm to another or in substantial injury to the financial inter-
est or property of another.49 The Court provided no specific
explanation of its reasons for adopting mandatory disclosure
requirements or for its decision to expand the disclosure re-
quirements to the prevention of non-bodily harm. °
In a statement accompanying the release of the new rules,
Chief Justice Robert N. Wilentz explained, "[w]e believe that
Another explanation for the bar's acquiescence to this change in the
rules is that the legal culture of the organized bar in New Jersey was
different than the legal cultures represented in the ABA House of Dele-
gates. This difference is suggested in an editorial a few months earlier in
which the New Jersey Law Journal expressed clear disapproval of the
ABA's rejection of the Kutak proposal. The newspaper noted: "The wring-
ing of legal hands at the House of Delegates seems shocking. We in New
Jersey are doing our duty to our clients and courts and at the same
time serving a standard of conduct higher than that rejected by the
A.B.A." Attorney's Duty to Report Client Fraud, 111 N.J. L.J. 329, 332
(1983). See also Bruce Rosen, Lawyer-Client Rules Toughened, THE
BERGEN RECORD, July 20, 1984, at Al, A16 (noting that while trial law-
yers fought for the adoption of the ABA Model Rules in other states,
"there was no such move in New Jersey").
49. The rule provides:
(b) A lawyer shall reveal such information to the proper authori-
ties, as soon as, and to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes
necessary, to prevent the client
(1) from committing a criminal, illegal or fraudulent act that the
lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result in death or substan-
tial bodily harm or substantial injury to the financial interest or
property of another.
RPC 1.6(b)(1). Another unexpected and controversial addition to the New
Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct was RPC 3.3(a)(5), which stated
that a lawyer shall not knowingly "fail to disclose to the tribunal a ma-
terial fact with knowledge that the tribunal may tend to be misled by
such failure."
50. See Administrative Office of the Courts:* State of New Jersey,
Press Release on the Rules of Professional Conduct (July 19, 1984) (copy
on file with the Rutgers Law Review); Comment to RPC 1.6, 114 N.J.
L.J. 53 (Supp. at 3) (1984).
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these new Rules of Professional Conduct represent sound prin-
ciples that protect the public and the integrity of the legal
profession and maintain New Jersey's position as a leader in
setting and upholding high professional standards."5 The
New Jersey bar voiced no opposition to RPC 1.6(b), even
though it contained the most far-reaching disclosure require-
ments of any attorney code of conduct in the country. 2 The
new rules were hailed by some as a welcome reordering of
priorities53 and criticized by others as "an extremely unfor-
tunate development."54 Thus, a radical experiment commenced.55
51. Press Release, supra note 50.
52. See Robert G. Seidenstein, Lawyers Required to Report Illicit Plots
of Clients, STAR LEDGER, July 20, 1984, at 17; Judy Rotholz, Court: Law-
yers Must Snitch on Clients, THE TRENTONIAN, July 20, 1984, at 1. The
bar may have been silent about Rule 1.6 because it was so concerned
about RPC 3.3(a)(5). See supra note 49. The latter rule was the subject
of a letter from the Trustees of the State Bar Association to the New
Jersey Supreme Court, stating that that rule had generated "near uni-
versal concern" and asking that the Court withhold its implementation.
Letter from Raymond R. Trombadore, First Vice President, New Jersey
State Bar Association, to the Supreme Court of New Jersey 2 (Aug. 9,
1984) (copy on file with the Rutgers Law Review).
53. One member of the Debevoise Committee described the reordering
of priorities:
The New Jersey Rules place the public interest before the inter-
ests of both clients and lawyers, and the interests of clients
ahead of those of lawyers. . . . Although traditional adversary
ethics (reflected in former rules) provide a legal and, perhaps, a
moral justification to ignore the public interest whenpursuing the
interests of a client, the New Jersey Rules clearly do not. [foot-
notes omitted]
Michael P. Ambrosio, The "New" New Jersey Rules of Professional Con-
duct: Reordered Priorities for Public Accountability, 11 SEToN HALL LE-
GIS. J. 121, 130 (1987).
54. See Bruce S. Rosen, New Jersey Adopts Code Tougher than ABA's,
NAT'L L.J., Aug. 6, 1984, at 3 (remarks of John C. Elam, past president
of American College of Trial Attorneys).
55. Subsequently, Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Nevada, North
Dakota, Texas, Virginia and Wisconsin adopted mandatory disclosure
requirements to prevent serious bodily harm. Florida and Virginia require
disclosure when lawyers learn that a client plans to commit any crime.
FLA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4-1.6 (1992); VA. CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR #4-101(D) (1994). Wisconsin's rule is
similar to New Jersey's RPC 1.6. See Wis. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
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II. THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR CONFIDENTIALITY AND
DISCLOSURE RULES WHEN CLIENTS PLAN To CAUSE HARM
Before considering the responses of New Jersey lawyers to
clients who plan to harm others, it is useful to identify briefly
some of the theoretical justifications for confidentiality and
disclosure under both mandatory and permissive schemes. 6
Those justifications are infused with intuitive assumptions
about the ways in which attorneys and clients behave when
lawyers are confronted with clients who are likely to seriously
harm others.
A. The Rationale For "Strict" Confidentiality
Proponents of strict confidentiality57 view the lawyer as the
client's defender against the world and rely heavily on the
same justifications supporting the attorney-client privilege. 8
DUCT FOR ATTORNEYS SCR 20:1.6 (1988).
56. There is no dearth of law review articles analyzing the theoretical
justifications for attorney confidentiality when clients plan, to commit
future wrongdoing. See supra note 6. See also Kenneth J. Drexler, Note,
Honest Attorneys, Crooked Clients and Innocent Third Parties: A Case for
More Disclosure, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 393, 405-13 (1992); Timothy J.
Miller, Note, The Attorney's Duty to Reveal a Client's Intended Future
Criminal Conduct, 1984 DuKE L.J. 582, 592-600 (1984). The purpose of
this section is to move the discussion beyond critiques of strict confidenti-
ality and to take a look at the rationales for disclosure.
57. When commentators analyze the justifications for confidentiality,
they often assume a "strict confidentiality" model. E.g., Subin, supra note
6, at 1159-72; Zacharias, supra note 6, at 359-70. In fact, only one state
seems to require lawyers to maintain strict confidentiality even when a
client intends to cause serious bodily harm to another. CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (Deering 1993). See also San Diego County Bar
Association Legal Ethics and Unlawful Practices Committee Opinion 1990-
1, 6 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 394 (1990) (lawyers are
prohibited from disclosing a client's intention to kill an informant). Forty-
two states permit or require lawyers to disclose client information to
prevent future financial and property crimes. Drexler, supra note 56, at
405 n.61. At this point, the debate within the bar is not about "strict"
confidentality, but is largely a debate over the proper scope of the excep-
tions. See THE LAW OF LAWYERING, supra note 9, §1.6:102 at 130.
58. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text. See also MONROE
H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 5 (1975). See
generally Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth Continued: More Dis-
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They contend that confidentiality exceptions will interfere with
the development of client trust and will discourage clients from
using or freely communicating with their counsel. 9 In es-
sence, if clients know that a communication about future
wrongdoing may be disclosed, then other important communi-
cations may not occur.
In addition to this broad based concern, the "more focused"
argument for strict confidentiality is that a confidentiality
requirement will in fact help prevent serious harm to the pub-
lic.6" The reasoning is as follows: (1) client confidentiality en-
courages clients to tell their lawyers that they are contemplat-
ing wrongful acts; (2) lawyers who learn of these plans will try
to dissuade their clients; and (3) lawyers who try to dissuade
their clients from wrongdoing will succeed.6 ' Confidentiality
proponents argue that if the client is deterred from communi-
cating with counsel about those future plans by fear of attor-
ney disclosure, then the attorney will not have the opportunity
to prevent the wrongful act.
Another justification for strict confidentiality is that it pro-
motes client autonomy. It is widely agreed that clients are
entitled to know about exceptions to client confidentiality rules
in order to make informed decisions about whether to disclose
information to their counsel.62 Confidentiality proponents ar-
gue that as a practical matter, lawyers do not tell clients about
the exceptions to confidentiality rules. 3 Strict confidentiality
closure, Less Privilege, 54 U. COLO. L. REV. 51, 62 (1982).
59. See id. See generally DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN
ETHICAL STUDY 189-90 (1988). For example, even clients who have no
plans to commit wrongful acts may be deterred from communicating fully
with their lawyers because they cannot make the fine distinctions that
lawyers must make between future, past and ongoing wrongdoing.
60. See THE LAW OF LAWYERING, supra note 9, § AP4:104 at 1263.
61. See, Subin, supra note 6, at 1166; Zacharias, supra note 6, at 369-
70; MODEL RULES Rule 1.6 cmt.
62. See, e.g., Drexler, supra note 56, at 408; W. William Hodes, The
Code of Professional Responsibility, The Kutak Rules and the Trial
Lawyer's Code: Surprisingly, Three Peas in a Pod, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV.
739, 786 (1981); Pizzimenti, supra note 16, at 481-83; Roy M. Sobelson,
Lawyers, Clients and Assurances of Confidentiality: Lawyers Talking
Without Speaking, Clients Hearing Without Listening, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 703, 711 (1988); Subin, supra note 6, at 1166.
63. This argument is supported by existing empirical research. See
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thus promotes client autonomy because it causes lawyer's ac-
tions to conform to client expectations that lawyers will main-
tain confidentiality.6
B. The Rationale For Mandatory Disclosure
Proponents of disclosure devote much of their effort to dem-
onstrating why the justifications for strict confidentiality do
not bear up under scrutiny."5 Perhaps their strongest argu-
ment is that there is no evidence that clients are discouraged
from talking with their lawyers as a result of exceptions to
confidentiality rules, and that pure self interest would cause
clients to talk.6 They also question whether and to what ex-
tent lawyers dissuade their clients from committing wrongful
acts."
infra text accompanying note 95.
64. Zacharias, supra note 6, at 367-68.
65. E.g., Subin, supra note 6, at 1159-72; See generally, Zacharias,
supra note 6, at 361-76.
66. As Professor Simon has noted:
People would have ample incentives to disclose adverse informa-
tion to counsel even without confidentiality safeguards because
they are honest and law abiding, because they cannot make
reliable judgments about when it is in their interests to with-
hold, or because in many business contexts they risk liability by
failing to seek good legal advice.
William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1083, 1142 (1988). See also Bruce M. Landesman, Confidentiality and the
Lawyer-Client Relationship in THE GOOD LAWYER 208 (David Luban ed.
1983); Developments, supra note 6, at 1474, 1476; Deborah L. Rhode,
Ethical Perpectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 614 (1985);
Subin, supra note 6, at 1163-65.
67. See Subin, supra note 6, at 1166-68 ("[e]ven assuming that law-
yers regularly advise their clients to adhere to the law, it does not neces-
sarily follow that lawyers are effective as law enforcers"). See also au-
thorities cited in Zacharias, supra note 6, at 369 n.83. But see Fried,
supra note 6, at 492 n.275.
A third argument against strict confidentiality is that lawyers do
not need complete client candor and that it should not be encouraged at
the cost of silencing lawyers so that they cannot prevent harm to third
parties. In fact, there is some evidence that lawyers believe that they do
not need to know everything that their clients might tell them in order
to provide adequate representation. See Zacharias, supra note 6, at 367.
While lawyers probably do not need to know everything their clients
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While these points deserve serious consideration, they do not
explain why there should be mandatory disclosure rules, par-
ticularly when most states do not require the public to act to
prevent harm to others.6" Considering that ten states current-
ly require disclosure of client information to prevent some
types of prospective client harm to a third party,69 it is appro-
priate to ask what are the justifications for requiring lawyers
to disclose client confidences in order to prevent a client from
seriously harming another?
One major reason for disclosure of client information in this
context is to prevent harm to third parties.70 It seems one of
the justifications for a disclosure requirement is that the priv-
ilege conferred on lawyers to practice law, and the lawyer's
role as an officer of the court, give rise to an obligation to pro-
tect the public from a client who intends to cause serious
harm.7' Society's interests are judged to outweigh the client's
interests when the client is contemplating future wrongdo-
ing.72 The broader philosophical justification for mandatory
disclosure is that a moral society requires this result.
73
Disclosure proponents also offer other, related arguments to
support their position. They contend that lawyers should be re-
quired to disclose simply because they can more conveniently
do so than others.74 In addition, if lawyers are required to dis-
might tell them, the real question is whether lawyers need to know the
information that is being withheld, which is a very difficult question to
answer without also asking clients.
68. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
69. See supra note 55.
70. Landesman, supra note 66, at 207-08.
71. Subin, supra note 6, at 1175. See generally Frankel, supra note
58, at 52.
72. A pervasive theme of the New Jersey Rules of Professional Con-
duct is that accountability to the public interest at times outweighs the
duty of loyalty to the client. Ambrosio, supra note 53, at 130. See also
Jennifer Hall, States Modifying ABA's Ethic's Rules, LEGAL TIMES, Aug.
12, 1985 at 1 (indicating revision of Virginia code also addressed this
balance).
73. Subin, supra note 6, at 1105-06, 1169, 1172. See also LUBAN,
supra note 59, at 205.
74. Professor Subin has argued that a lawyer's duty to disclose felo-
nies is the "precise equivalent" of the doctor's duty to report gunshot
wounds, communicable diseases or dangerous patients. Subin, supra note
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close client confidences to prevent harm to others, then they
will be better able to dissuade clients from planned wrongdoing
by threatening to disclose if the clients' plans are not aban-
doned.7" Even if lawyers cannot dissuade their clients, they
are more likely to disclose to prevent harm than lawyers would
be under a permissive disclosure scheme.76
Finally, those favoring disclosure argue that unless there is
mandatory disclosure of client plans to cause future harm,
clients will believe that lawyers will do anything for them. As
a result of this belief, clients will be encouraged to bring more
wrongful schemes to their lawyers, and society's view of law-
yers and legal institutions will suffer." Societal disapproval of
the rules governing lawyers may also adversely affect the abili-
ty of lawyers to continue to regulate themselves.78
6, at 1173 & n.378. These analogies are not precise. Injuries or illnesses
present no ambiguity about whether they have occured. The duty to
report dangerous patients is also an imperfect analogy, because it is
based on a "control" theory. See Marc L. Sands, Note, The Attorney's
Affirmative Duty to Warn Foreseeable Victims of A Client's Intended Vio-
lent Assault, 21 TORT & INS. L.J. 355, 356, 363 (1986). Lawyers cannot
commit their clients to institutions, nor do they have the same level of
control that parents have over children or masters have over their ser-
vants.
75. Subin, supra note 6, at 1166, 1173-74.
76. Subin, id. at 1174. One response to these arguments is that if
lawyers fear that they must disclose client confidences, lawyers will be
more reluctant to obtain complete information from their clients. In order
to reconcile a lawyer's duty of loyalty and desire to maintain confidences
with an obligation to disclose, attorneys might be less aggressive in elicit-
ing information. Cf. Developments, supra note 6, at 1476-77. As Professor
David Luban has noted, "[t]here is a personal dimension to confidentiali-
ty: clients trust their lawyers, and lawyers want to deserve that trust."
LUBAN, supra note 59, at 186. If lawyers seek to avoid learning certain
information, they will have few opportunities to dissuade.
77. Report, supra note 39, Supp. at 10. See generally Zacharias, supra
note 6, at 375.
Concern about public opinion seems to have affected the decisions
in some states to support mandatory disclosure rules. See, e.g., supra
note 47 and accompanying text. In fact, it is not clear that a disclosure
requirement to prevent future harm would significantly affect the public's
perception of lawyers. See infra note 103 and accompanying text.
78. Lawyers have a substantial interest in maintaining their role in
the regulation of the bar, which is increasingly under siege. To the ex-
tent that the public disapproves of the rules used to govern the bar, the
[Vol.47:81
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C. The Rationale for a Permissive Disclosure Scheme
Permissive disclosure rules afford lawyers latitude to deal
with very difficult and often highly fact specific problems.79
Proponents of this approach hope that clients will confide in
their lawyers and that lawyers who learn of a client's intention
to commit a crime or fraud will listen without concern about a
disclosure requirement and dissuade a client from committing
the act.8" Supporters of permissive rules also believe that
when lawyers are faced with clients who will not abandon
plans to cause harm, lawyers will "do the right thing."81
Permissive disclosure rules are also justified on the ground
that they promote lawyer morality. It has been argued that
lawyers' attitudes about their role suffer when confidentiality
is required because it can distort the view of their own obliga-
tions "as moral and autonomous individuals."82 In essence, a
strict confidentiality requirement permits lawyers to fall back
on the code requirement and their role as "lawyers" and to
ignore the morality of their conduct. In contrast, a permissive
scheme forces them to confront these difficult issues.
rules may ultimately be revised by courts, legislatures and regulatory
agencies. See Drexler, supra note 56, at 400-02; Koniak, supra note 8, at
1477-78. But see David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105
HARv. L. REV. 799, 810-11 (1992) (suggesting it is not unrealistic to
assume that the Model Rules and the CPR will be used by enforcement
officials to determine behavior for which lawyers can be sanctioned, even
if they do not approve of rules).
79. J. Michael Callan & Harris David, Professional Responsibility and
the Duty of Confidentiality: Disclosure of Client Misconduct in an Adver-
sary System, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 332, 356 (1976); Zacharias, supra note
6, at 405. Some have criticized permissive disclosure schemes because
they substitute the lawyer's views for society's judgment. See Subin, su-
pra note 6, at 1174. But see Simon, supra note 66, at 1145 (noting the
benefits of affording lawyers more discretion when representing clients).
80. Callan & David, supra note 79, at 356.
81. Professor William Hodes has expressed the view that as a prac-
tical matter when serious bodily injury is at stake, the permissive disclo-
sure rule will be read as "shall" and a strict confidentiality rule would be
ignored. Hodes, supra note 62, at 755-58,
82. Landesman, supra note 66, at 208-09; Subin, supra note 6, at
1091; Zacharias, supra note 6, at 372-73.
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Many of the utilitarian justifications for the rules governing
lawyers with clients who are contemplating wrongdoing can be
explored empirically. Before looking at the New Jersey study,
it is useful to review what is known to date about how attor-
neys view and use the attorney-client confidentiality rules, and
what attorneys actually do when confronted with clients who
intend to commit wrongful acts.
III. PRIOR EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
Lawyers and their relationships with their clients have been
the subject of several studies. 3 Unfortunately, relatively little
empirical research has focused on the assumptions underlying
the attorney-client confidentiality rules. s4 Even less effort has
been made to study empirically lawyer response to clients who
intend to commit wrongful acts that will substantially harm
another. 5 The absence of such research has been much not-
83. E.g., JEROME E. CARLIN, LAWYERS' ETHICS: A SURVEY OF THE NEW
YORK CITY BAR (1966); JOEL F. HANDLER, THE LAWYER AND HIS COMMU-
NITY: THE PRACTICING BAR IN A MIDDLE-SIZED CITY (1967); JOHN P.
HEINZ & EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUC-
TURE OF THE BAR (1982); DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT:
WHO'S IN CHARGE? (1974); Edward Laumann et al., Washington Lawyers
and Others: The Structure of Washington Representation, 37 STAN. L.
REV. 465 (1985).
84. There are two notable exceptions. See Notes & Comments, Func-
tional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its Implica-
tions for the Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 YALE L.J. 1226
(1962) [hereinafter YALE NOTE]; Zacharias, supra note 6, at 379-96. See
generally Note, Corporate Legal Ethics--An Empirical Study: The Model
Rules, The Code of Professional Responsibility, and Counsel's Continuing
Struggle Between Theory and Practice, 8 J. CORP. L. 601, 622 (1983).
85. Indeed, not much is even known about whether this problem pres-
ents itself with any frequency in practice. One of the few studies sug-
gesting that it might is Kenneth Mann's study of white collar criminal
defense lawyers. He found that "requests for legal counsel in order to
cover up future criminal acts are not frequent [but] neither are they a
rare phenomenon." MANN, supra note 7, at 111. See generally Zacharias,
supra note 6, at 389.
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ed,86 but little has been done to remedy the problem.8" Some
of the existing empirical research is summarized below.
A. What Clients Don't Know About the Confidentiality Rules
Laypersons seem to know that their communications with
lawyers are confidential, but they do not understand the excep-
tions to the general rule. According to a study conducted by the
Yale Law Journal in 1962 ('Yale study"), over 50% of the
laypersons surveyed8 correctly believed that lawyers did not
have a legal obligation to disclose confidential information if
asked to do so by a lawyer in court.89 At the same time, over
30% of the laypersons believed that lawyer-client communica-
tions were more protected than they in fact were.9
In a study conducted more than twenty-five years later in
Tompkins County, New York ("Tompkins County study"), these
basic findings were confirmed.9 The Tompkins County study
revealed that most clients claimed to know of attorney-client
86. Drexler, supra note 56, at 411; Fried, supra note 6, at 490; Lonnie
Kocontes, Client Confidentiality and the Crooked Client: Why Silence is
Not Golden, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 283 (1992); Subin, supra note 6, at
1165, n.353, 1168. See generally Developments, supra note 6, at 1474;
THE LAW OF LAWYERING, supra note 9, § 1.6:101 at 128.
87. See supra note 7. On the one hand, the relative lack of empirical
research is surprising because so many commentators have noted the
dearth of empirical research and because many of the assumptions under-
lying confidentiality could be tested on an empirical basis. On the other
hand, the absence of such research is not that surprising, because empir-
ical research is expensive and time consuming; it is far easier to analyze
someone else's study than to generate one's own.
88. The Yale study analyzed, inter alia, the responses of 108 layper-
sons who lived in the Eastern United States. Those answering the ques-
tionnaire tended to be "non-lower class socially and economically." YALE
NOTE, supra note 84, at 1227 n.6.
89. Id. at 1262. Almost two-thirds of the laypersons surveyed believed
that lawyers would not repeat client confidences.
90. Laypersons were asked whether they thought that a lawyer "would
refuse to talk even if ordered to do so by a judge." Id.
91. Cornell University is located in Tompkins County, New York. The
Tompkins County study analyzed 105 responses from lay people, includ-
ing 73 persons who had consulted lawyers in the past ("clients"). It also
analyzed 63 responses from lawyers. Zacharias, supra note 6, at 379.
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confidentiality.92 Over 42% of all the clients surveyed believed
that the confidentiality requirements are absolute.93
The Tompkins County study also revealed that "lawyers
overwhelmingly do not tell clients of confidentiality rules." 4
Even when the Tompkins County lawyers told their clients
about confidentiality, most told their clients "only generally
that all communications are confidential," and only one quarter
told their clients that any exceptions to the rule of attorney-
client confidentiality exist.95
Although these studies involved relatively small samples
and were comprised of a better-educated population than the
norm, they strongly suggest that many lay people do not un-
derstand the limits of attorney-client confidentiality. Perhaps
one reason why lay people do not understand is because law-
yers intentionally exaggerate the scope of confidentiality, be-
lieving that most of their clients misunderstand its scope.9"
B. What Clients and the Public Think About Confidentiality
Some empirical evidence indicates clients would be less
willing to disclose information to their lawyers if they believed
92. The vast majority of clients who were not told of confidentiality
directly by their lawyers claimed to know of the rule. Id. at 383 (79.1%).
93. Id. In fact, New York lawyers were permitted to disclose client
confidences to prevent any crime. N.Y. LAWYERS CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR# 4-101(C) (1992 & Supp. 1994).
94. The study showed that 22.6% of the lawyers surveyed "almost
never" informed clients of the confidentiality of their communications to
the lawyer. Another 59.7% of the lawyers surveyed informed their clients
of confidentiality in less than half of their cases. Zacharias, supra note 6,
at 382. When clients were asked a similar question, 53.5% of them con-
firmed that none of their attorneys had mentioned confidentiality. Id. at
383 n.155.
A 1982 study of corporate law practice also suggests that lawyers
do not tell clients of confidentiality rules. In that survey of 85 corporate
lawyers, almost 70% of them reported that they raised the issue of confi-
dentiality when interviewing corporate employees, but less than one-third
of that group seemed to raise the issue under all circumstances. Corpo-
rate Legal Ethics, supra note 84, at 604 & n.5-6, 622-23.
95. Zacharias, supra note 6, at 386 (27.8%).
96. Almost two-thirds (64.8%) of the lawyers surveyed thought that
more than three-quarters of their clients believed that confidentiality is
absolute. Id. at 386-87.
[Vol.47:81
LAWYER RESPONSE
their lawyers might disclose information. In the Yale Study,
more than 50% of the lay people believed they would be less
likely to make free and complete disclosure to a lawyer if there
were a legal obligation to disclose client information to another
lawyer in court.97 Over 15% of the Tompkins County lay peo-
ple indicated that they would withhold information from an at-
torney if the attorney promised confidentiality except for spe-
cific types of information which the lawyer described in ad-
vance.98 The Tompkins County respondents also indicated
that a permissive disclosure rule or other disclosure by lawyers
would cause them to trust and use lawyers less.99 These ques-
tions, however, were hypothetical and do not necessarily reflect
what clients would do if confronted with the actual need for
lawyers' services. 100
Not surprisingly, lay people view the confidentiality rules
differently when the rules may be protecting someone else's
secrets. In the Yale study, only 45% of the lay people clearly
supported the attorney-client privilege.1"' In the Tompkins
97. YALE NOTE, supra note 84, at 1262 (50.9%).
98. Zacharias, supra note 6, at 386 (15.1%). Professor Zacharias notes
that this percentage is not that different from the 11.3% of the clients
who reported that they withheld information from their lawyers under
current confidentiality rules, and states that this similarity suggests that
"the general sense of trust in attorneys as professionals, rather than
strict confidentiality rules, is what fosters client candor." Id. This conclu-
sion seems premature. It may be that the 11.3% who withheld informa-
tion from their lawyers knew that New York permitted lawyers to reveal
client confidences under certain circumstances and that those clients
withheld information precisely for that reason.
99. -When lay people were asked about a proposed code amendment
that would allow disclosure by a lawyer "who reasonably deems it neces-
sary in the public interest," approximately one third said they would con-
sult lawyers less frequently and they would trust lawyers less. Zacharias,
supra note 6, at 388 n.191, 395.
100. There is no serious dispute that if clients know that there are
exceptions to confidentiality, it will inhibit some client communications in
some circumstances. Zacharias, supra note 6, at 358. As Professor Zacha-
rias has noted, the question is not really "whether confidentiality as a
whole comports with its general underlying theory," but "on how well
confidentiality serves its justifications and whether limited exceptions
would undermine the rules' effects." Zacharias, supra note 6, at 381.
101. YALE NOTE, supra note 84, at 1262. Lay people were asked wheth-
er they thought that lawyers should have a legal obligation to disclose
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County study, most laypersons believed that lawyers should be
permitted to disclose client information in a variety of contexts
not currently permitted by state codes in order to prevent
injury to others."2 At the same time, most of the Tompkins
County laypersons did not believe that public perception of
lawyers would be improved by a broad permissive disclosure
rule that would allow disclosures in the public interest."'0
C. Lawyer Willingness and Ability to Prevent Harm
Relatively little research has focused specifically on the
theory that strict confidentiality enables lawyers to dissuade
clients from wrongdoing, or on the alternative theory that
mandatory disclosure better equips lawyers to prevent harm. A
study of white-collar criminal defense attorneys suggests that
some lawyers attempt to neutralize the impact of information
about prospective wrongdoing rather than to dissuade their
clients from committing wrongful acts.' Other evidence sug-
gests that at some points in their careers, most lawyers dis-
suade clients from taking improper action, but it is not known
what techniques they use to dissuade, how consistently they
confidential information if asked to do so by a lawyer in court. Id.
102. Zacharias, supra note 6, at 394-95. At the same time, anywhere
from 10-25% indicated that if lawyers could disclose client information in
those cases, it would affect their willingness to use lawyers. Id.
103. The respondents were asked about' the effect of a hypothetical code
amendment that would allow disclosure by a lawyer who "reasonably
deems it necessary in the public interest." Zacharias, supra note 6, at
388. More than 55% of the respondents believed that such a change
would either have no effect on the public perception of lawyers or that it
would cause the public perception of lawyers to decline. Id. at n.191. As
Professor Zacharias noted, this question is problematic because it asked
respondents to gauge the view of the public and not to report their own
views, but the results probably are somewhat indicative of the
respondents' views. Id. at n.195. It does -not necessarily reflect what the
public would think of a more focused disclosure rule.
104. MANN, supra note 7, at 106-17.
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try to dissuade or how often they succeed.' °5 How much of a
role confidentiality plays in those efforts is also not known.0 °
Finally, no study has examined what lawyers do when they
fail to dissuade their clients and must decide what step, if any,
to take next. In fact, little is known about how lawyers view
the disclosure rules or whether they obey the rules in practice.
The purpose of the New Jersey study was to begin to explore
some of these questions.
IV. THE NEW JERSEY STUDY
A thirty-nine question mail survey was used to explore how
New Jersey attorneys respond when they believe a client may
be about to commit a wrongful act that is likely to result in
substantial harm to others. The survey also attempted to de-
termine whether New Jersey attorneys comply with their obli-
gation to disclose under the Rules of Professional Conduct and
if not, why not.
A. The Survey
The surveys were mailed in September 1993 to approximate-
ly 1950 lawyers throughout New Jersey who were identified as
practicing members of the state bar. A cover letter that accom-
panied the survey explained the purpose of the survey and
requested anonymous responses. 7
The experiences of lawyers who practiced criminal law and
family law were of particular interest because of the nature of
105. In the Tompkins County study, more than three-quarters of the
respondents indicated that confidentiality had at some point in their
careers enabled them to dissuade a client from taking improper action.
Zacharias, supra note 6, at 381; see also Fried, supra note 6, at 492
n.275.
106. In the Tompkins County study, more than 40% of the lawyers
indicated that the existence of confidentiality had "occasionally" enabled
the lawyer to obtain information and then dissuade a client from taking
improper action. Zacharias, supra note 6,. at 381 & n.146. The answer to
this compound question does not reveal how often the existence of confi-
dentiality had enabled lawyers to obtain information.
107. Anonymous responses were used to try to prevent self-selection of
respondents who might not be proud of their approach to the problem
and to try to insure that the answers were not self-censored.
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the problems their clients confront. Consequently, approxi-
mately one-third of the surveys were mailed to lawyers who
were believed to devote a portion of their practice to criminal
defense work °8 and about one-fifth were mailed to lawyers
who identified themselves as devoting part of their practice to
family law."9 Most of the remaining surveys were mailed to
lawyers engaged in other practice areas"' who did not work
for any governmental entity."' Surveys were also provided to
New Jersey public defenders who requested a copy." 2
108. The names of 569 lawyers were obtained from the membership list
of the 1992-93 Handbook of the Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers-
New Jersey [hereinafter ACDL Handbook]. The names of an additional
120 lawyers who indicated that they devoted at least 25% of their prac-
tice to criminal defense work were obtained from the Westlaw New Jer-
sey West's Legal Directory. Search of Westlaw, WLD database (July 14,
1993).
109. Westlaw was used to obtain the names and addresses of 377 New
Jersey lawyers who indicated that they devoted 20% or more of their
time to practicing matrimonial, domestic or family law. Search of
Westlaw, WLD database (approx. July 22, 1993).
110. A search of Westlaw initially identified 20,994 lawyers who did
not list themselves as practicing any specific percentage of criminal, mat-
rimonial, family or domestic law. Search of Westlaw, WLD database (July
22, 1993). Lawyers from this list were selected by a random sampling in
the pattern 1-5, 100-05, 200-05, etc. The names and addresses of 877
lawyers were selected by this method.
Thus, the sampling technique used in this survey combined a sys-
tematic random sample of New Jersey lawyers with a stratified sample of
lawyers who devoted a substantial portion of their practice to criminal
law or family law, in order to obtain an adequate number of such law-
yers to discern trends and make statistical inferences. See EARL R.
BABBIE, THE PRACTICE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH 184-90 (6th ed. 1989).111. Government lawyers were excluded from the sample because they
have somewhat different ethical obligations than other lawyers and be-
cause it was believed that they would not have much experience with
this problem.
112. Approximately 80 surveys were mailed directly to New Jersey pub-
lic defenders whose addresses were obtained either from the ACDL Hand-
book or the Westlaw, WLD database. In an effort to help the author
reach the remaining 220 New Jersey public defenders, Dale Jones, Esq.,
Assistant Public Defender of the State of New Jersey, circulated a memo-
randum to all New Jersey public defenders advising them of the avail-
ability of the survey, encouraging participation in the survey and indicat-
ing how a copy of the survey could be obtained.
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To obtain a complete picture of attorney conduct when law-
yers encounter clients who are about to commit future wrong-
doing, clients should also be surveyed. Clients of the attorney-
respondents could not be surveyed, however, because the attor-
neys answered the surveys anonymously."3 No attempt was
made to identify and survey randomly selected clients who had
discussed future wrongdoing with their lawyers. Efforts to
survey certain client groups should be considered in the fu-
ture."'
1. The Survey Design
A passive-observation design was used for the eleven page
survey."5 The first section requested some limited demo-
graphic information."6 The second section asked very gener-
ally about attorney-client confidentiality. The third and fourth
sections inquired in detail about actual attorney experience
with clients who were going to commit wrongful acts that were
likely to result in substantial bodily harm, financial injury or
property damage to another."7 The last section of the survey
113. Even if the identities of the attorneys were known, they have a
duty to maintain the confidences of their clients and could not reveal the
information. See generally In re Advisory Opinion No. 544 of the N.J.
Sup. Ct. Advisory Comm. on Professional Ethics, 511 A.2d 609 (N.J.
1986) (holding that legal services organizations may not disclose client
identity to private or governmental entities without consent or legal justi-
fication).
114. Clients were not surveyed because of the difficulty and expense of
locating a sufficiently large sample using random sampling techniques.
The New Jersey study reveals information about the practice areas of
lawyers who encounter the problem and the types of wrongful acts that
they encounter which may permit more focused sampling in the future.
See infra text accompanying notes 131, 138, 142.
115. The survey questions are found in the Appendix. For a discussion
of passive observation, see NOREEN L. CHANNELS, SOCIAL SCIENCE METH-
ODS IN THE LEGAL PROCESS 74-75 (1985).
116. There was a real risk that many lawyers would refuse to answer
a longer survey. Due to space constraints, certain information such as
gender and race was not requested.
117. The term "bodily harm" is used in this Article to encompass the
idea of death as well as substantial bodily harm. "Financial injury or
property damage" is used to convey the idea of "substantial injury to the
financial interest or property of another" set forth in RPC 1.6.
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asked about attorney views and practices, including views
about mandatory disclosure rules. To obtain unbiased and
unapologetic responses from the attorneys, the survey never
mentioned RPC 1.6 and did not explain the attorney's duty to
disclose under that rule. The majority of the survey questions
were multiple choice, although the survey also asked a number
of open-ended questions to allow attorneys to elaborate on
their experiences. Space was left at the end of the survey for
additional comments.
2. The Survey Respondents
The survey yielded a response rate of almost 40%,11 which
is considered a good rate for a survey of professionals. In cer-
tain respects, the survey respondents resembled the general
population of active New Jersey lawyers."9 Almost three-
quarters of the respondents were admitted to the bar within
the last twenty years, which is similar to the 73.3% admitted
in the general population since 1976.120 Approximately one-
half of the survey respondents were also admitted to practice
in another state, as compared to 59.6% of the lawyers in the
general New Jersey population.' 2'
In other respects, the respondents differed from the general
population of New Jersey lawyers. The survey respondents
were somewhat more experienced attorneys than the general
population of New Jersey lawyers." A far greater percentage
118. After removing names from the sample because they were not
attorneys admitted to practice in New Jersey or for other valid reasons,
the total sample size was 1926 lawyers. Valid. responses to the mail sur-
vey totalled 762, producing a response rate to the mail survey of 39.6%.
An additional 14 surveys were completed in response to the internal
memorandum to public defenders inviting them to complete the survey.
Thus, the total number of responses in the study was 776.
119. Table 1.
120. The total number of lawyers admitted to practice was 50,314 as of
March 1993, but it appears that less than 47,000 were actively engaged
in practice. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS AND OFFICE OF AT-
TORNEY ETHICS, CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BAR OF THE STATE OF NEW
JERSEY 1992 at 3 (1993) [hereinafter CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BAR].
121. Table 2. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BAR, supra note 120, at 5. New
York was the most frequent other state of admission for both groups.
Table 3.
122. Although three-quarters of the lawyers in both groups were admit-
110 [Vol.47:81
LAWYER RESPONSE
of the respondents worked in private practice than did the
general population." Not surprisingly, almost one-third of
the survey respondents devoted a substantial amount of their
time to criminal defense work and almost one-quarter of the
respondents devoted a substantial amount of their time to
family law practice."' These percentages are probably higher
than the percentage of such practitioners in the general popu-
lation of New Jersey lawyers because they were over-sam-
pled."
Thus, while the sample is representative in its geographic
distribution throughout the state, it cannot be characterized as
truly random... or as completely representative of the gener-
al population of New Jersey lawyers. Nevertheless, the results
provide some indication of the ways in which some New Jersey
attorneys respond to the problem of a client who intends to
cause serious harm to another.
B. Survey Results
1. The Problem is Real
The survey revealed that the problem of a client who may
cause serious harm to another is not just a hypothetical prob-
lem; "'27 it is a real one. Sixty-seven lawyers reported that
ted within the last 20 years, see supra text accompanying note 121, ap-
proximately one-third of the survey respondents had been admitted to the
bar since September 1983. See Table 1 (37.7%). In contrast, 61% of all
New Jersey lawyers were admitted to practice since 1980. CHARACTERIS-
TICS OF THE BAR, supra note 120, at 3.
123. See Table 4 (89.9%). Only 52.8% of all New Jersey lawyers worked
in private practice in 1992. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BAR, supra note
120, at 7.
124. Table 5. For the purposes of this article, "substantial" means 20%
or more of the attorney's time was devoted to the particular practice
area.
125. Many of the respondents also devoted a substantial amount of
time to personal injury and real estate practices. In contrast, relatively
few respondents practiced tax or environmental law. Table 5.
126. See supra note 110. For a discussion of "systematic" or "quasi-ran-
dom" samples, see CHANNELS, supra note 115, at 94-97. Only the 877
names derived from the Westlaw general practice list were selected
through systematic random sample.
127. More than one respondent suggested that the problem of a client
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since January 1985, they had encountered at least one occasion
on which they reasonably believed that a client was going to
commit a specific wrongful act that was likely to result in
death or substantial bodily harm to an identifiable third par-
ty." Almost half of those lawyers had encountered the prob-
lem on more than one occasion."29 About 20% of the lawyers
who had encountered the problem identified the anticipated act
as homicide. 3 ° Another 58% identified the act as assault or
battery, including acts of domestic violence.' Other antici-
pated wrongful acts included arson, kidnapping, driving while
intoxicated and terrorism.1
32
Approximately 190 attorneys reported that since January
1985 they had encountered occasions on which they believed
that a client was going to commit a wrongful act that was
likely to result in substantial injury to the financial interests
or property of another.'33 Most of the lawyers who had con-
fronted this problem had encountered it on more than one
occasion."M The most commonly reported anticipated act was
who discusses with counsel future criminal or fraudulent acts was an
academic exercise rather than a real problem. I.D. No. 619, Question 34.
See I.D. Nos. 007, 300, at Question A.C..
128. Table 6. RPC 1.6(b) does not limit the attorney's disclosure obliga-
tions to situations in which an identifiable third party will be harmed,
but pre-testing of the survey suggested that the survey questions should
be so limited to avoid ambiguous responses. Some lawyers routinely rep-
resent clients who they reasonably believe intend to commit serious
crimes, but whose victim is not identifiable. I.D. No. 174, Question 8;
I.D. No. 332, Question 8. As one lawyer noted, "90% of my criminal
practice deals with possession-sales [of controlled drug substances]. My
answer "none" to questions [about clients whom the lawyer believes will
substantially harm others] result from the word "identifiable" [third par-
ty]. I have no idea of the identity of the next purchaser." I.D. No. 599,
Question A.C. Of course, in those cases RPC 1.6(b) still requires disclo-
sure, but lawyers who represent repeat offenders indicated that they
draw a distinction between the general belief that criminal activity will
continue and situations when identifiable third parties were likely to be
harmed.
129. Table 6 (47.8%).







financial fraud.'35 Some of the other anticipated wrongful
acts were vandalism, theft, environmental pollution and per-
jury.13
One important caveat must be noted. These responses do not
necessarily reflect the frequency with which the general New
Jersey lawyer population encounters clients who intend to
commit serious wrongful acts because the survey respondents
probably included more criminal defense attorneys and family
law attorneys than would be found in the general lawyer popu-
lation.13 These practitioners reported encountering the prob-
lem of clients who were contemplating future wrongdoing sig-
nificantly more often than other lawyers. 138 Moreover, prior
experience with the problem may cause respondent self-
selection. 139 At most, the survey responses reflect that this
problem occurs with some frequency in certain types of prac-
tices, and occurs at least occasionally in a wide variety of prac-
tices. 40
135. Table 9. The term "financial fraud" in this article includes all
types of fraud resulting in the loss of money or other assets including,
but not limited to, bankruptcy, insurance, real estate, tax or securities
fraud and secreting marital assets.
136. Table 9. Perjury is governed by a separate sub-section of RPC
1.6(b) which requires disclosure to prevent a client from committing a
fraud upon a tribunal. See RPC 1.6(b)(2). Nevertheless, since perjury also
involves a future crime that may result in substantial injury to the fi-
nancial interests or property of another under RPC 1.6(b)(1), it is includ-
ed here.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 124-25.
138. Lawyers who devoted at least 40% of their time to practicing
criminal law or at least 20% of their time to practicing family law en-
countered clients whom they believed were going to cause substantial
bodily harm, financial injury or property damage significantly more often
than lawyers who practiced in other areas. Table 47.
139. For example, lawyers who had previously encountered the problem
may have been more likely to complete the survey because they were
interested in the subject, skewing upward the reported frequency of the
problem. At the same time, it is possible that attorneys who were not
comfortable with the manner in which they had previously handled the
problem may have decided not to answer the survey.
140. There were lawyers who reported encountering this problem who
spent at least 90% of their time practicing in the following areas: Bank-
ruptcy (I.D. Nos. 214, 318, at Question 2); Commercial litigation (I.D.
Nos. 260, 696, at Question 2); Corporate (I.D. No. 104, Question 2); Envi-
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The survey also revealed that lawyers who work in certain
law office settings were more likely to learn of clients' plans to
commit wrongful acts than other lawyers."" For example, le-
gal services attorneys were significantly more likely to encoun-
ter clients who they believed intended to physically harm oth-
ers than attorneys in law firms or other practice settings."'
Attorneys practicing in small firms encountered the problem of
clients who were contemplating wrongful acts that would cause
injury to financial interests 'or property more often than law-
yers in other practice settings.
4 3
The lawyers who reported that they had encountered clients
who they "reasonably believed" were going to commit wrongful
acts seemed fairly convinced about their clients' plans.4 4 Few
of these lawyers thought that their clients did not commit the
anticipated acts because they were mistaken about their
clients' original intentions. 45
ronmental (I.D. No. 722, Question 2); and Trust & Estates (I.D. No. 163,
Question 2).
141. Lawyers were asked to indicate whether they worked as solo prac-
titioners, in small law firms (2-20 lawyers), in medium or large firms
(more than 20 lawyers), in a corporation, or in a legal services office. See
Appendix infra Survey Question 1.
142. Table 13. The significance of this finding should not be overstated.
Criminal defense attorneys, as a group, were more likely to encounter
the problem of future client wrongdoing than most other lawyers. See
supra text accompanying note 138. Nevertheless, this finding is somewhat
surprising given the view expressed by more than one public defender
that their clients do not trust them. See, e.g., I.D. No. 730, Question A.C.
As one public defender noted, "defendants often have distrust in a public
defender." I.D. No. 494, Question 7. That lawyer also wrote, "a defendant
often believes that a public defender is an agent of the state who will
not preserve confidences. In trial preparation, I spend much time
building a trust relationship. Usually, a defendant believes that their
public defender is the last person to speak to about a criminal plan." I.D.
No. 494, Question A.C. See also I.D. No. 730, Question A.C..
143. Table 14.
144. Although much concern has been voiced about whether a lawyer
can "know" that a client is going to commit a wrongful act, see, e.g.,
MODEL RULES 1.6 cmt. (1983), it-was mainly the attorneys who had
never encountered the problem who indicated concern about how they
would "know" that the client would commit the act. E.g., I.D. No. 193,
Question A.C.; I.D. No. 150, Questions 8, 34, A.C.
145. Lawyers who believed that their. clients were going to commit
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The lawyers may have felt fairly confident about their be-
liefs because their clients directly told them about their plans.
Almost 60% of the lawyers who believed that their clients were
going to cause death or bodily injury formed those beliefs as a
result of direct oral communications from clients.146 Likewise,
more than 80% of the lawyers who believed their clients were
going to cause substantial financial injury or property damage
reached that conclusion based on client statements or ques-
tions.147 Thus, any suggestion that lawyers do not learn of cli-
ent plans directly from their clients-and that client confiden-
tiality is not compromised by disclosure requirements148 -- is
probably incorrect.
Finally, a number of attorneys indicated that they had had
clients who spoke about future wrongful acts that would cause
substantial harm to others, but that the lawyers did not "rea-
sonably believe" that the client would commit the acts. 49 For
example, some lawyers noted that their clients were simply
"letting off steam" or sending up "trial balloons."'15 Others
noted that clients raised questions as to the advisibility of
taking certain action, rather than expressing a clear intent to
do so."' Some of the lawyers felt that they needed to respond
wrongful acts, but whose clients did not ultimately commit the acts, were
asked why they thought the acts did not occur. Only 4 out of 52 lawyers
indicated that the reason was because their clients were not serious or
they were wrong about their clients' intentions to commit acts likely to
result in death or bodily injury. See Table 10. Only 3 out of 96 lawyers
said they were wrong about their clients' intentions to cause financial
injury or property damage. See Tables 10A & 10B.
146. Table 11 (59.7%).
147. Table 12 (80.7%).
148. See generally Zacharias, supra note 6, at 399 (questioning whether
information used to dissuade client misconduct was type covered by confi-
dentiality rules).
149. I.D. Nos. 019, 146, 184, 193, 290, 313, 368, 661, 740, at Question
A.C.; I.D. Nos. 254, 365, 535, at Question 34. As one lawyer observed:
"In family law practice you have a great deal of emotion-You must take
some 'talk' with a grain of salt. You sometime [sic] get 'I would like to
break his neck. . . .' You have to discount this type of statement as
venting of ones [sic] frustrations." I.D. No. 580, Question A.C.
150. I.D. Nos. 19, 290, at Question A-C.
151. I.D. No. 229, Question 29. As one attorney wrote, "please note
that though only a handful of clients have told me that they fully in-
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strongly to these client statements in order to prevent the
client from developing serious plans to commit wrongful
acts." 2
These responses suggest that the problem of clients who
communicate to their lawyers that they are contemplating
future wrongful acts may be more pervasive than indicated
above.' In considering whether mandatory disclosure rules
"work," it is important to remember that those rules may in-
deed have some effect on clients who are communicating their
thoughts about future wrongdoing to their lawyers, even
though clients are not communicating these ideas with such
conviction that they are causing lawyers to conclude that their
clients are reasonably likely to commit wrongful acts.
2. Lawyers Try to Dissuade Their Clients From
Wrongdoing-and Think They Do
An important premise underlying attorney confidentiality is
that lawyers who learn of client plans to commit wrongful acts
will attempt to dissuade their clients from committing those
acts and that they usually succeed in those efforts.' The
survey responses revealed that New Jersey lawyers who rea-
sonably believed that their clients intended to commit wrongful
acts did try to dissuade their clients from committing the acts.
Most of the lawyers who reported having clients who were
going to commit wrongful acts indicated that their clients did
not commit the acts after talking with their lawyers. The law-
yers believe they were largely responsible for preventing the harm."
tended to do something illegal, scores have asked me 'what if types of
questions." I.D. No. 506, Question A.C..
152. E.g., I.D. No. 70, Question A.C.; I.D. No. 110, Questions 29, 34.
153. Another indication that the problem arises more often than reflect-
ed in the text is that some attorneys reported that they tell prospective
clients about their obligations to disclose at their first meeting, after an
individual indicates an intention to cause harm to others, and then de-
cline to represent that person. E.g., I.D. Nos. 391, 445, 543, at Question
A.C. These lawyers did not indicate that they had had clients who they
reasonably believed were going to commit wrongful acts likely to harm
others, but they may have answered differently if they had not immedi-
ately terminated their contact with the prospective client. I.D. Nos. 391,
445, 543, at Question B, A.C..
154. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
155. Tables 10 & 10A. It is not possible to determine from the lawyers'
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a. Attorneys Try to Dissuade Their Clients From Harming
Others
The vast majority of lawyers who believed that their clients
were going to commit wrongful acts that were likely to cause
substantial bodily harm reported that they discussed this belief
with their clients.15 In those discussions, the lawyers ap-
pealed mainly to their clients' self-interest. Virtually all of
those lawyers discussed the legal consequences of the act."'1
Approximately three-quarters of the lawyers discussed the
likelihood of apprehension. 5 ' Less than half of the lawyers
discussed the morality of the act.'59 Almost 20% of the law-
yers explicitly threatened to disclose the anticipated act to
someone else 60 and about 5% threatened to withdraw from
the representation.'
Similarly, almost all of the attorneys who believed that their
clients were going to commit wrongful acts likely to result in
substantial injury to the financial interest or property of an-
other discussed their belief with their clients. 62 More than
responses whether clients in fact abandoned plans to commit wrongful
acts as a direct result of talking with their lawyers. Ideally, clients
should also be asked this question.
156. Table 16 (92.4%). Lawyers were asked about the "most recent
occasion on which you believed that [a] client was going to commit a
criminal, illegal or fraudulent act that was likely to result in death or
substantial bodily harm to another." See Appendix infra heading to Sur-
vey Question Nos. 10-20. The lawyers who did not talk with their clients
did not do so because they did not believe the client, there was inade-
quate proof, or the defendant was already in custody. Table 16B.
157. Table 16A (96.7%). The lawyers were able to identify more than




160. Tables 16A & 16E (19.7%). "Lawyers who threatened to disclose"
are defined in this Article as those lawyers who explicitly told their cli-
ents that they would disclose information to prevent the act.
161. Table 16C (4.9%).
162. Tables 17 & 17A (97.8%). Of the four lawyers who did not discuss
their belief with their clients, one reported that someone else discussed it
with the client, one could not get in touch with the client, one said "that
was their business" (gambling) and one attorney did not want to know
more. (Citations on file with the author).
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97% of these lawyers discussed the legal consequences of the
act. 6 ' Over 57% of the lawyers discussed the likelihood that
the client would be apprehended.6 4 Approximately 41% dis-
cussed the morality of the act.6 5 Almost one-quarter of the
lawyers threatened to withdraw from the representation.' 6
About 12% explicitly threatened to disclose the information in
order to prevent the act.'67
Lawyers chose to talk about practical reasons for not com-
mitting the wrongful acts rather than engage in philosophical
discussions. Less than half of the lawyers talked about the
morality of the act, even when bodily harm was at issue.6 8
As one lawyer noted
Discussing the morality of the act is, in my view[,] an ex-
tremely poor strategy. First, morality is rarely a high priority
for persons engaged in criminal acts or who are desperate to
avoid or terminate prosecution. Second, discussions of morali-
ty can sound pompous [and]/or condescending to a client[,]
thereby breaking down the channel of communication be-
tween us. In these situations, it is my view that maintaining
communication and client confidence is the only effective
means of preventing the client from taking the [wrongful]
action . 6 9
Although it has been suggested that exceptions to confidential-
ity may be desirable because they will encourage more fre-
quent moral dialogue between attorney and client,7 ° these
responses indicate that many lawyers will avoid such dialogues
even when disclosure is required.




167. Tables 17B, 17F & 17G.
168. See supra notes 159, 165 and accompanying text.
169. I.D. No. 542, Question 13f. As another lawyer explained, "Usually
explanation of the chance of exposure hazard and increased sentence,
without getting philosophical, helps him quickly see the light back to the
truth and planned theory of the case, letting the chips fall where they
may." I.D. No. 576, Question A.C. See also I.D. No. 338, 506, at Question
34.
170. E.g., Zacharias, supra note 6, at 404.
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b. Clients Abandoned Their Plans After Talking With
Their Lawyers
The New Jersey lawyers reported that most of their clients
did not commit the anticipated wrongful acts.'7' More than
60% of the lawyers who reported that their clients did not
cause the anticipated bodily harm believed that they were
responsible for dissuading their clients.'72 Most of those law-
yers believed that they dissuaded their clients by using reason-
ing other than the threat to disclose their clients' plans.'73
More than three-fourths of the attorneys whose clients did not
commit anticipated wrongful acts that were likely to result in
financial injury or property damage believed that they dissuad-
ed their clients by using reasoning other than the threat to dis-
close. '
The lawyers' comments confirm that they believe that they
are able to dissuade their clients from committing wrongful
acts. As one lawyer noted,
I can't conceive of a situation where I would be obliged t[o]
report a client. Twenty years ago [when] working Legal Aid
Landlord-Tenant a Portuguese speaking... man came to the
New York office carrying a gun. His mother had been served
with a dispossess notice. He was going to kill the landlord. If
171. Tables 19 & 20. Of the lawyers -who believed that their clients
were going to commit wrongful acts likely to result in substantial bodily
harm, 78.8% reported that their clients did not ultimately commit the
acts. Table 19. Of the lawyers who believed that their clients were going
to commit acts likely to result in substantial financial injury or property
damage, 53.5% reported that their clients did not commit the anticipated
acts. Table 20.
172. Table 10 (61.5%).
173. Id. Twenty-eight out of 52 lawyers (53.8%) believed that they
dissuaded their clients by using reasoning other than the threat to dis-
close. Another 7.7% thought that their clients did not commit the acts at
least in part because they had threatened to disclose. Other reasons why
the clients did not commit the wrongful acts included that the lawyer
was wrong about the client's intentions, the client had no opportunity,
the client calmed down, the plan was too difficult and the time for the
act had not yet arrived.
174. Table 10A (77.1%). An additional 13.5% of the lawyers thought
that the client did not commit the act at least in part because they had
threatened to disclose. Id.
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I could talk him out of his gun [and] his intentions without
knowing one word of Portuguese[,] I can dissuade anyone.17
Several other lawyers expressed the same basic sentiment,
although somewhat less colorfully.""
On the surface, these lawyer responses appear to support
some of the basic assumptions underlying the justifications for
maintaining client confidentiality in the context of future client
wrongdoing. Nevertheless, this information provides only a
partial picture.' Even if most lawyers regularly try to dis-
suade clients from committing wrongful acts and even if they
succeed, it does not necessarily follow that they are able to do
so because of confidentiality rules or because of mandatory
disclosure. To understand the interplay between the rules and
efforts to dissuade, it is necessary to step back and consider
how the confidentiality and disclosure rules are discussed and
used in practice.
3. Attorney Discussions About Confidentiality and
Disclosure Rules
a. Lawyers Talk More About Confidentiality Than About
Its Exceptions
The New Jersey study revealed that lawyers talked with
their clients about confidentiality more than previously report-
ed, but they do not talk much about the exceptions. More than
95% of the lawyers said that in the last twelve months they
175. I.D. No. 178, Question A.C.
176. As another lawyer wrote, "I am of the old school of confidence
which clients have in their attorneys and believe I am persuasive enough
to stop them from taking any action which would get them in trouble or
harm someone else either financially or bodily harm." I.D. No. 124, Ques-
tion 39. See also I.D. Nos. 273, 275, at Question 39; I.D. No. 576, at
Question A.C..
177. Although the responses suggest that virtually all of the lawyers
who "reasonably believed" that their clients intended to commit a wrong-
ful act attempted to dissuade their clients, see supra notes 156, 162-69
and accompanying text, this finding should be interpreted cautiously.
Other survey responses suggest that some attorneys took steps to insure
that they never obtained enough information to form a "reasonable belief"
that their clients were going to commit a wrongful act. See infra notes
198-203 and accompanying text.
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personally informed at least some of their clients of the confi-
dentiality of their communications.' Criminal defense attor-
neys were significantly more likely to tell most of their clients
about the confidentiality of their communications than other
lawyers. 1"9 Even lawyers who did not practice a substantial
amount of criminal law discussed confidentiality with their
clients with some frequency: over 41% of those lawyers dis-
cussed confidentiality with more than half of their clients with-
in the preceding twelve month period.8 0
While the vast majority of lawyers told at least some of their
clients about confidentiality, most of them did not tell their cli-
ents about the disclosure rules. Over 65% of the New Jersey
lawyers informed none of their clients in the last twelve
months about an attorney's obligation to disclose client confi-
dences to prevent a client from committing a wrongful act.'
Another 23% of the respondents stated they had informed less
than 10% of their clients of this disclosure obligation.'82
178. Table 24. Lawyers were asked, "[w]hat percentage of your clients
do you personally inform of the confidentiality of their communications to
you?" See Appendix infra Survey Question 6.
179. Table 26. Over 52% of the lawyers who devoted a substantial
portion of their practice to criminal defense work said that during the
last 12 months they personally informed more than three-quarters of
their clients about confidentiality. Id. In contrast, about one-third of the
other lawyers informed more than three-quarters of their clients about
confidentiality during the same time period. Id.
180. Table 26 (41.8%). These numbers may actually understate the
percentage of clients who are told of confidentiality by lawyers because
they may exclude long-time clients who have previously been told about
the rule. In addition, they do not reflect the clients who may have been
told of confidentiality by another lawyer who works with the survey re-
spondent.
In the Tompkins County study, only 17.7% of the lawyers informed
their clients of attorney-client confidentiality in half or more of their
cases. See Zacharias, supra note 6, at 382. The differences between the
two studies may be due in part to the -fact that the Tompkins County
lawyers were engaged in a rural, more personal law practice than many
of the New Jersey lawyers; the Tompkins County lawyers may have felt
less need to encourage client trust than the New Jersey lawyers.
181. Table 30 (65.4%).
182. Id. Only 5% of the respondents said that they communicated this
information to more than three-fourths of their clients. Id.
1994]
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The lawyers' failure to inform clients about the disclosure
rule cannot be attributed to a belief that clients already know
about the rules. Like the Tompkins County lawyers, most New
Jersey lawyers did not believe that their clients understood
that attorneys may be required to disclose client confi-
dences.l"3
Many New Jersey lawyers seem to discuss confidentiality in
order to develop client trust and to encourage the free flow of
client information."' At the same time, most lawyers do not
discuss the subject of mandatory disclosure unless they must
do so, apparently because they feel that discussions about
confidentiality exceptions interfere with client trust.185 These
lawyers seem to believe they will obtain less than full disclo-
183. See Zacharias, supra note 6, at 386-87. The New Jersey lawyers
were asked what percentage of their clients they believed understood that
"there are circumstances under which a lawyer may be obligated to dis-
close attorney client confidences to a third party without the client's
consent?" See Appendix infra Survey Question 7. Approximately 20% of
the lawyers believed that none of their clients understood that there were
circumstances under which a lawyer may be obligated to disclose client
confidences without a client's consent. Table 27A. Another 40% of the
respondents believed that less than 10% of their clients understood that
a lawyer could be obligated to disclose. Id. As the Tompkins County
study revealed, lawyers' views are not necessarily an accurate reflection
of actual client understanding of the rule, see Zacharias, supra note 6, at
387, but they shed insight into lawyers' conduct.
184. Indeed, the fact that criminal defense attorneys tell a greater
number of their clients about confidentiality than most lawyers suggests
that they may experience more difficulty obtaining client trust and infor-
mation than other lawyers. See MANN, supra note 7, at 40-55. On the
other hand, this theory is difficult to reconcile with the responses indicat-
ing that public defenders were significantly less likely to inform their
clients about confidentiality than were other criminal defense lawyers.
Table 27. Public Defenders should be interviewed to help interpret these
findings.
185. As one corporate lawyer explained:
My experience is that clients are more forthcoming if they know
that their communications cannot be disclosed. This presents the
attorney with the opportunity to discuss the situation [with] the
client and prevent the act from occurring. My experience has
proven this to be successful. These discussions would never take
place if the client knew they could be disclosed and an opportu-
nity might be lost.
I.D. No. 478, Question A.C.
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sure from their clients if they promise anything less than com-
plete confidentiality.'
It appears that some lawyers do not mention the disclosure
rules to their clients unless they are obviously relevant to a
particular client or to clients seeking a particular type of repre-
sentation. 7 For example, lawyers who practiced family law
and those who practiced criminal law were significantly more
likely than other lawyers to discuss this confidentiality excep-
tion with at least some of their clients within the past
year." One reason for this finding may be that they encoun-
ter clients who are contemplating future wrongdoing more
often than other practitioners."9
A similar explanation may account for the finding that law-
yers who have had at least one client who they reasonably
believed was going to commit a wrongful act likely to result in
financial injury or property damage were more likely to tell at
least some of their clients about the mandatory disclosure rule
than lawyers who had never encountered the problem.'9 ° Ex-
posure to the problem of future client wrongdoing on one occa-
sion may cause a lawyer to be more sensitive to the problem,
186. E.g., I.D. No. 779, Question A.C. As one attorney explained, "[i]f I
started explaining the fine points of attorney-client priviledge [sic] [cli-
ents] would begin to suspect they could not trust me." I.D. No. 538,
Question A.C.
187. As one lawyer noted in response to the question about advising
clients of the mandatory disclosure rules, "most clients do not have situa-
tions that would call for such advice." I.D. No. 59, Question 35. See also
I.D. No. 69, Question 35 (indicating that the attorney tells 75% or more
"of criminal clients"). Another lawyer who noted that criminal tax fraud
issues arise in matrimonial cases informed a large percentage "of matri-
monial clients" about the mandatory disclosure rule. I.D. No. 400, at
Question 35.
188. Tables 18, 31, 31A & 31B.
189. Table 47. Moreover, family law practitioners reportedly encounter
a lot of talk about future wrongdoing, even if it never comes to pass. See
supra note 149.
190. Tables 18, 18A and 22.
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to learn of the disclosure obligation,' and to alert future cli-
ents to the disclosure rules.
b. Discussions of Mandatory Disclosure Rules May Inhibit
Client Communications
As previously noted, lawyers who tell clients about the dis-
closure rule seem to do so because they anticipate that they
may become relevant in the course of the representation. The
survey responses indicate that attorneys who inform clients
about mandatory disclosure rules may be doing so at times
that may inhibit client communications about future wrongdo-
ing or may be doing so in ways that insure such communica-
tions never occur.
Approximately one-quarter of the attorneys who told any of
their clients about New Jersey's mandatory disclosure rules
did so at the first substantive meeting with the client.'92 An-
other 42% of the lawyers did so when they believed that the
client "might be about to discuss" a future criminal or fraud-
ulent act. 9 ' Thus, over two-thirds of the lawyers who advise
any of their clients of the mandatory disclosure rules are tell-
ing them about the rules at the beginning of the representation
or when they believed that a client might be about to discuss a
future crime or fraud.9 4
191. It was clear from the attorneys' responses that some lawyers had
no idea that they are currently required to disclose to prevent a client
from committing wrongful acts. See, e.g., I.D. Nos. 366, 367, 385, at
Question A.C.
192. Table 32 (25.2%). The lawyers who reported that they told 75% or
more of their clients about mandatory disclosure rules usually did so at
the first substantive meeting with their clients. Table 33 (76.9% inform
at first meeting).
193. Table 32 (42.1%).
194. Lawyers who practiced a substantial amount of family law were
somewhat more likely to tell their clients of the rule at the first substan-
tive meeting than lawyers in other practice areas. Table 34. It may be
that family law practitioners anticipate that the subject of client wrong-
doing will be raised with varying levels of seriousness during the rela-
tionship and wish to be sure clients understand the rules up front. Even
though criminal defense lawyers also have reason to anticipate that the
subject of wrongdoing may be raised, they may have more pressing con-
cerns in the first meeting, including the immediate need to establish
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On the one hand, this approach unquestionably promotes
client autonomy. If a client's communications are not protected,
clients are entitled to know it before they speak.'95 On the
other hand, by discussing the mandatory disclosure require-
ments at the first substantive meeting with the client or when
the lawyer thinks that the client might be about to discuss
future wrongdoing, the lawyer reduces the likelihood that
clients will say any more about the subject. For example, one
lawyer noted that "[t] he client is advised of my obligation prior
to my obtaining any knowledge." 9 ' The lawyer had not en-
countered clients who were going to commit a wrongful act,
"perhaps because of [the lawyer's] position" with respect to
informing clients of the disclosure rules.'97
A small number of lawyers take their discussions about
disclosure one step farther and explicitly warn clients to say no
more about future wrongful acts. 8 Some of these attorneys
employ methods of information control to avoid learning of
facts that may interfere with their ability to represent their
clients.'99 For example, when one criminal defense lawyer be-
trust in order to obtain information. See MANN, supra note 7, at 39-40.
195. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
196. I.D. No. 38, Question 34.
197. Id. at Question A.C. Another lawyer similarly would "[i]nform [the]
client that I have a duty to report to [the] authorities any illegal act
that I have been informed by [the] client that [the] client plans to com-
mit. This usually forestalls admission." I.D. No. 711, Question 34.
198. Several attorneys responded in this way to a question which asked
"[i]n your current practice, if a client's statements cause you to begin to
suspect that a client might be planning to commit" a future crime or
fraud, what do you do? See Appendix infra Survey Question 34. Of 697
respondents, 3.3% explicitly stated that they would stop their clients from
talking. Table 23A. Although some lawyers read this question as a hypo-
thetical question, it was clear that others were answering based upon
actual practice. See, e.g., I.D. Nos. 144, 510, at Question 34.
199. Kenneth Mann has described the technique of "information control"
in some detail. As he noted:
Attorneys do not want to be viewed by a client as unethical, nor
do they want to go home thinking that their work is an obstruc-
tion of justice. To accomplish this end, they have acquired tech-
niques for controlling what clients will talk about with them.
Each of these techniques limits the frame of inquiry and can
serve the attorney's interest of not receiving information.
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gins to suspect that the client might be about to discuss future
wrongdoing, the lawyer "stop[s] the client. I don't want to
know."00 The lawyer added, "I discourage my clients from
discussing any matter which may lead to my knowledge of any
planned or contemplated future activity. I like to concern my-
self strictly with the defense of the matter for which I am re-
tained." 1
Other attorneys appear to cut off client communications
because of concerns about maintaining confidentiality. When
one lawyer begins to suspect that a client might be about to
discuss future wrongful conduct, the lawyer "warn[s] the client
that the attorney-client privilege might not protect the commu-
nication and that [he] should not be told."0 2 Similarly, anoth-
er lawyer would "[i]nform him not to tell me anything like that
because of my duty to inform the authorities. °3
These efforts at information control enable attorneys to
avoid professionally difficult situations, but they may also cut
off any opportunity for lawyers to dissuade clients from com-
mitting future wrongful acts. As the attorneys' comments indi-
cate, some lawyers cut off the communication in this way be-
cause there is a duty to disclose.
4. The Use and Abuse of the Disclosure Requirement
a. Lawyers Are Not Threatening to Disclose to Prevent
Harm to Others
Most New Jersey lawyers report that they are not using
threats to disclose to dissuade their clients from committing
MANN, supra note 7, at 106. Techniques that lawyers use to avoid ac-
quiring unwanted information include limiting the time frame of the
discussion and controlling the client's dialogue by literally saying, "Is]top,
I don't want to hear about that." Id. at 107-09.
200. I.D. No. 510, Question 34.
201. Id. at 510, Question A.C.; see also I.D. No. 699, Question 34. In-
terestingly, the responses did not reflect that criminal defense lawyers
were any more likely than other lawyers to believe that they would stop
clients from talking if they began to suspect that a client is about to dis-
cuss wrongful conduct.
202. I.D. No. 277, Question 34; see also I.D. Nos. 587, 627, at Question
34.
203. I.D. No. 147, Question 34; see also I.D. No. 194, Question 34.
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wrongful acts. Less than 20% of the lawyers who discussed
with their clients their belief that their clients were going to
cause substantial bodily harm to another explicitly threatened
to disclose the information in order to prevent the act.20 4 On-
ly 12% of the lawyers who discussed with their clients their
belief that their clients intended to cause substantial injury to
the financial interests or property of another explicitly threat-
ened to disclose information to prevent the act.20 5
The lawyers' reports of their threats to disclose may not tell
the entire story because they do not reveal whether clients
understood other statements by their lawyers as threats to
disclose. For example, lawyer responses do not reveal whether
lawyers' discussions with clients about the lawyers' disclosure
obligations were perceived by clients as implicit threats to
disclose. As one lawyer noted, "I would not indicate that I
would disclose client information [because] client would per-
ceive same as threat. Client would thereby be unwilling to
confide in me if he believed I would disclose such informa-
tion. '20
6
In addition to the lawyers who explicitly threatened to dis-
close client information to prevent substantial harm to others,
no more than another 15% of the lawyers may have discussed
their duty to disclose with clients whom they believed were
going to cause substantial harm.20 7 It is not known whether
204. Tables 16A & 16E (19.6%). Public defenders explicitly threatened
to disclose client confidences to prevent bodily harm more often than
lawyers in other practice settings. Table 49. This could be due, in part,
to the fact that public defenders do not rely upon client referrals for
their business or upon high levels of client satisfaction for continued
employment. The higher percentage of public defenders who threatened to
disclose may also be due to respondent self-selection. See supra notes
112, 139 and accompanying text.
205. Tables 16A & 17F (11.8%).
206. I.D. No. 54, Question 39.
207. Almost 11% of the lawyers with clients who were likely to cause
bodily harm (10.9%) and almost 15% of the lawyers with clients who
were likely to cause financial injury or property damage (14.4%) indicated
that they discussed the subject of confidentiality in ways that the law-
yers did not describe as threats. Tables 16A, 16G, 17B & 17C. It is diffi-
cult to determine exactly how many of those lawyers who spoke with
their clients discussed their obligation to disclose because some did not
provide sufficient information. The attorneys were asked whether they
19941
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clients perceived this information as a threat to disclose, a
warning to say no more, or both.
Thus, explicit or implicit threats to disclose were used by no
more than 30% of the New Jersey lawyers." 8 Relatively few
of the lawyers thought that their threats to disclose caused
their clients to abandon their plans.0 9
b. Many Lawyers Are Not Disclosing Client Information to
Prevent Harm to Others
Few New Jersey lawyers reported that they had ever dis-
closed client information in order to prevent a client from com-
mitting a wrongful act. This finding is not in itself surprising,
since disclosure is a last resort and is not required until the
lawyer "reasonably believes" disclosure is necessary to prevent
the act.210 Consequently, lawyers are not required to disclose
when their clients abandon or cannot execute the wrongful
plans. Nevertheless, nine years after the adoption of RPC
1.6(b), many lawyers were not disclosing client confidences to
prevent wrongful acts, even when disclosure was necessary to
prevent substantial harm to others.
Many of the sixty-seven lawyers who believed that their
clients were going to commit wrongful acts likely to result in
future death or bodily injury had reason to conclude that dis-
closure was not necessary to prevent the wrongful act."
discussed "the confidentiality of your conversation with your client" and
were then asked to "describe what you said." See Appendix infra Survey
Question 13d. Some of the attorneys who indicated that they discussed
confidentiality with their clients did not provide an explanation of what
they said and so it is not possible to determine whether they told their
clients about their disclosure obligation or told them-as some lawyers
clearly did-that the information would be kept confidential. Tables 16A
& 17B.
208. See supra notes 204-05 and accompanying text; see also supra note
207.
209. See Table 10 (7.7% of clients dissuaded from causing bodily injury
by threats to disclose); Table 10A (13.5% of clients dissuaded from caus-
ing financial injury or property damage by threats to disclose).
210. See RPC 1.6(b)(1), supra note 49.
211. Table 10. Thirty-two lawyers reported that they dissuaded their
clients and four reported that the client had no opportunity to commit
the act (usually because the client was incarcerated). Thus, thirty-six
128 [Vol.47:81
LAWYER RESPONSE
Twelve of the sixty-seven lawyers disclosed client information
to an "authority" or opposing lawyer to prevent the wrongful
act,212 but at least twelve other lawyers who had a duty to
disclose to prevent the harm failed to do so.21 Thus, only
about half of those lawyers who were required to disclose un-
der RPC 1.6(b) to prevent death or substantial bodily harm
had in fact made disclosure.214
Attorneys disclosed their clients' plans far less frequently to
prevent substantial harm to the financial interests or property
of another. Only 100 of the approximately 190 lawyers who en-
countered clients whom they believed were going to cause
financial injury or property damage indicated that the antici-
pated acts did not occur.215 Only eight lawyers arguably dis-
closed client information to prevent the wrongful acts."' Ad-
ditional attorney disclosures might have prevented substantial
harm; twenty-two lawyers who did not disclose reported that
the wrongful act was committed1 7 and another sixty-two did
not know if the act had occurred.1 ' Thus, less than 9% of the
lawyers had valid reasons to conclude that disclosure was not required.
Id. Six other lawyers reported that the wrongful acts did not occur be-
cause they were wrong about their client's intentions or their clients
calmed down, Table 10, but it was not clear from the survey responses
whether they reached this conclusion before the wrongful act was sup-
posed to occur-in which case there was no duty to disclose-or after-
wards.
212. Table 35.
213. Of those 12 lawyers who did not disclose, eight of the lawyers did
not know whether their clients committed the acts and four of the law-
yers reported that their clients subsequently committed the wrongful acts.
Table 19. Some of the six lawyers described supra note 211, may have
also had a duty to disclose, but they are not counted here.
214. One of the lawyers who failed to disclose reported that the client
committed murder.
215. Table 20.
216. Table 20A. In fact, eight overstates the level of disclosure under
Rule 1.6(b). Although Rule 1.6(b) requires disclosure to the "proper au-
thorities," at least four of the eight disclosures were not made to "author-
ities," but were made to persons who were allied with the client such as
relatives of the client and other professionals retained by the client.
217. Table 20.
218. Id. The large number of attorneys who did not know whether
their clients committed the act may be due to a combination of factors.
First, most of these acts involved fraud, which may be difficult for law-
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lawyers who should have disclosed under RPC 1.6(b) to pre-
vent financial injury or property damage arguably made disclo-
sure substantial .219
Although the level of non-disclosure is higher than might
have been predicted,22 ° it is not surprising that lawyers were
more willing to reveal client confidences to prevent death or
bodily injury than they were to prevent substantial harm to
the financial interest or property of another. This may be ex-
plained by the strong cross-cultural ethic concerning the pres-
ervation of life22' and the strong bar ethic concerning protec-
tion of client confidences. 2 Those views seem to affect attor-
ney behavior far more than the existence of RPC 1.6(b).
i. RPC 1.6(b) Is Not the Primary Reason Why Lawyers
Disclose Client Information
The mandatory disclosure rule seemed to have some effect
on the New Jersey attorneys who disclosed client information
to prevent harm to others, but the effect is difficult to measure.
yers to detect, even after being warned that it may occur. Second, law-
yers may deliberately choose not to look for evidence of client fraud to
avoid possible liability. Third, many attorneys may have withdrawn from
the representation before the client decided whether to commit the act.
See infra notes 254-55 and accompanying text.
219. The wrongful act that was most often not disclosed by the lawyers
was financial fraud in divorce cases. See I.D. Nos. 27, 146, 155, 280, 751,
at Question 23. Again, it is important to note that there may be a dis-
proportionate number of these cases because of the lawyer population
surveyed.
220. The degree of non-disclosure is greater than might have been
predicted based upon the Tompkins County study, in which lawyers were
asked whether a "good attorney" would disclose information in various
hypothetical situations. See Zacharias, supra note 6, at 392-93. More than
65% of the Tompkins County lawyers indicated that a good attorney
would disclose information under certain circumstances to prevent bodily
harm and more than half of the lawyers indicated that a good attorney
would disclose to prevent one instance of financial injury. Id. The re-
sponses of the New Jersey lawyers suggest that there is a substantial
difference, between what a hypothetical "good attorney" would do and
what a real life lawyer will do when confronted with a real client and a
very serious problem.
221. JOHN Q. WILSON, THE MORAL SENSE 17 (1993).
222. Koniak, supra note 8, at 1427-31.
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Virtually all of the lawyers who disclosed client information to
prevent substantial harm indicated that they would have dis-
closed even if disclosure were optional under the Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct.2' At the same time, most of the lawyers
ranked compliance with the Rules of Professional Conduct as
one of the most important reasons why they disclosed.224
The most important reason cited by the disclosing attorneys
for revealing client information to prevent bodily harm was
concern about the intended victim.' As one attorney ex-
plained, "[there didn't have to be any rule. I just know there
wouldn't be any question about what I would do." 26 Concern
about compliance with the Rules of Professional Conduct was
ranked second by most of those lawyers."
The lawyers who disclosed to prevent substantial injury to
the financial interests or property of another ranked concern
about compliance with the Rules of Professional Conduct as
slightly more important than concern about the victim.'
Concern for the client seemed to be another important reason
for disclosing, particularly when bodily harm was at stake. 9
Other reasons cited by the disclosing lawyers for revealing
223. Ten of the twelve lawyers who disclosed to prevent bodily harm
said they would have disclosed client information even if disclosure were
optional under the Rules of Professional Conduct, one would not have
disclosed and one was unsure. Table 36. Six of the eight lawyers who
disclosed client information to prevent financial injury or property dam-
age said they would have disclosed anyway, one was not sure and one
did not answer that question. Table 37.
224. Tables 35 & 35B.
225. Table 35. Eleven of the twelve lawyers who disclosed client infor-
mation to prevent bodily harm did so at least in part because of concern
for the victim. Id. Eight of those lawyers ranked this concern as the
number one reason why they made disclosure. Id.
226. Telephone Interview with Attorney A, supra note 3.
227. Table 35.
228. Table 35B. Of the eight lawyers who disclosed their clients' inten-
tion to cause financial injury, seven lawyers cited compliance concerns as
one of the reasons for disclosure, and two lawyers ranked it as the num-
ber one reason. Id. Six lawyers also cited concern for the victim as a
reason for disclosure and two of those lawyers said it was the number
one reason why they disclosed. Id.
229. Three of the lawyers who disclosed to prevent bodily harm ranked
it as the second most important reason for disclosing. Tables 35 & 35B.
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client information to prevent harm included concern about
criminal prosecution, concern about the lawyer's civil liability
and concern about reputation." °
While moral concerns about the victim seemed to underlie
most attorney disclosures to prevent bodily harm, the eight
lawyers who disclosed to prevent injury to financial interests
or property seemed to disclose in order to protect themselves.
Five of those lawyers indicated that concern about their repu-
tations was one of the reasons why they disclosed and two
lawyers ranked it as the second most important reason.2'
Three lawyers ranked concern about civil liability as the third
most important reason why they disclosed. 2
Although not easily measurable, the mandatory disclosure
rule seems to have some impact on attorney decisions to dis-
close client confidences to prevent serious harm. With the
use of RPC 1.6(b) to create civil standards of liability, the im-
portance of the rule to lawyer decision-making will undoubted-
ly grow." For the moment, though, RPC 1.6(b) appears not
to be the primary reason why lawyers disclose when lawyers
are confronted with clients who contemplate future wrongdo-
ing.
ii. Lawyer Opinions and Failure to Comply With the
Disclosure Rule
Lawyers offered a variety of reasons for not disclosing client
information to prevent harm to others, but most of these rea-
sons relate to a basic disagreement with the disclosure
rule. 5 For example, lawyers who did not disclose client in-
230. IkL
231. In contrast, concern about reputation was cited by only one of the
attorneys who revealed client information to prevent bodily harm. Table
35.
232. Table 35B. Most of these lawyers disclosed a crime or fraud al-
ready in progress, id., and may have been concerned that they could be
viewed as personally involved in the wrongful conduct.
233. At least one of the lawyers would not have disclosed to prevent
bodily harm if disclosure were optional under the Rules of Professional
Conduct. Table 36.
234. See infra note 305.
235. The reasons for not disclosing client information to prevent sub-
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formation to prevent harm often indicated that they did not do
so because of the perceived importance of maintaining client
trust. One public defender who did not reveal the intention of
a client to commit a crime noted concerns about the client
"losing confidence in my representation of him" and the "repu-
tation of working for prosecutor." ' The public defender con-
cluded, "Once you lose your reputation for fighting for your
client regardless of the information that you receive from him,
it leaves you in a vulnerable position." ' Another lawyer who
did not disclose the intention of a client to commit a murder
also cited a similar concern about maintaining a reputation for
being someone who could be trusted with a client's most sensi-
tive matters.2 8
The relatively low number of lawyer disclosures to prevent
harm to others may reflect fundamental disagreement with the
disclosure rules. 9 Some lawyers noted that they would "nev-
er" advise a client that they would disclose a confidential dis-
cussion.2 0 As one lawyer wrote, "if I felt someone was about
to disclose a plan to commit a future crime I would tell them
not to inform me because I believe that an attorney should not
be placed in the position of becoming an informant under any
stantial harm are not always philosophical. At least one lawyer did not
disclose out of fear of retribution. I.D. No. 132, Question 39. Another
lawyer explained "if I ever spoke of [organized crime] people and their
business I would never get any work and probably a beating which
would be deserved." I.D. No. 23, Question 39. Although no survey ques-
tion specifically focused on the impact of fear of retribution on attorney
disclosure, there is no question that it is a problem for some lawyers.
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
236. I.D. No. 13, Question A.C.
237. Id; see also I.D. No. 615, Question A.C.
238. The concern about reputation can take two different forms. For
some lawyers, it was a concern that their clients would trust them so
that they could provide the best possible representation. I.D. No. 13,
Question A.C. For others, it was the less high-minded, but no less real
concern about the impact of disclosure on the ability to earn a living.
I.D. No. 758, Question A.C.
239. Professors Hazard and Hodes have suggested that the New Jersey
Professional Responsibility Rules would provoke "significant civil disobedi-
ence" and lack of respect for the rules. See THE LAW OF LAWYERING,
supra note 9, AP4:104 at 1265.
240. I.D. No. 54, Question 39; see also I.D. No. 430, Question A.C.
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circumstances."2 4' Even nine years after the adoption of RPC
1.6, these feelings about maintaining the sanctity of client
confidentiality remained firmly rooted in the bar.242
Lawyer ambivalence about mandatory disclosure to prevent
substantial harm was confirmed by opinion questions. When
attorneys were asked whether they believed that the New
Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct should require lawyers to
disclose client confidences if necessary to prevent a client from
committing a criminal act that was likely to result in substan-
tial harm to others, they responded as follows:
TABLE A
Lawyers' Support of Disclosure Requirements to Prevent
Crimes Likely to Result in Harms to Others
Type of Harm Yes No
Death or Substantial Bodily Harm. 87.8% 10.8%
Substantial Financial Injury 53.5% 46.4%
Substantial Property Injury 54.8% 45.2%
Substantial Harm to Environment 60.3% 39.7%
As the numbers reflect, there is strong support for requiring
disclosure when a lawyer believes that death or bodily injury is
likely to result.243 In contrast, only a bare majority of the
lawyers supported a mandatory disclosure requirement to
prevent criminal acts likely to result in substantial injury to
the financial interest or property of another.244 Significantly
fewer criminal defense attorneys favored mandatory disclosure
rules to prevent wrongful acts than other attorneys.245
241. I.D. No. 587, Question A.C.
242. E.g., I.D. No. 751, Question A.C. (referring to the attorney-client
privilege as "sacred").
243. Table 45.
244. Il; see also I.D. No. 670, Question 37. There was somewhat more
support for disclosure to prevent substantial environmental harm, which
may be due to the perceived permanence of environmental damage or its
relationship to bodily injury. See I.D. No. 586, Question A.C.; I.D. No.
640, Question 37.
245. Table 21B. The significance level increased even further among
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The numbers changed considerably when lawyers were
asked whether there should be mandatory disclosure where a
client's fraudulent or illegal, but non-criminal acts were likely
to result in substantial injury to others.246
TABLE B
Lawyers' Support of Disclosure Requirements to Prevent
Fraudulent or Illegal Acts Likely to Result in Harm to Others
Type of Harm Yes No
Substantial Financial Injury 30.8% 69.2%
Substantial Property Injury 30.9% 69.1%
Substantial Harm to Environment 38.4% 61.6%
By large margins, New Jersey attorneys did not support man-
datory disclosure of fraudulent or illegal (but non-criminal)
acts to prevent substantial harm to the financial interests or
property of another.247
Lawyers' views about mandatory disclosure seem to directly
affect compliance. Far fewer attorneys disclosed to prevent
financial injury or property damage than to prevent bodily
harm.248 Lawyer disagreement with rules requiring disclosure
to prevent substantial financial injury and property damage
undoubtedly affect their willingness to disclose client confi-
dences to prevent such acts.249 This disagreement with the
rule, when coupled with the small chance that the lawyer who
lawyers who practiced 40% or more criminal law. Table 21A.
246. The question was intended to incorporate the language of RPC
1.6(b), which refers to "criminal, illegal or fraudulent" acts. See Appendix
infra Survey Question 38. As some attorneys noted, most serious fraud is
also a crime. I.D. No. 697, Question 38. Other attorneys noted that they
had difficulty with the concept of an illegal but non-criminal act. E.g.,
I.D. Nos. 66, 152, 621, at Question 38.
247. Table 45.
248. See supra notes 214, 219 and accompanying text.
249. The Tompkins County lawyers also seemed less inclined to think
that disclosure should occur when financial injury rather than bodily
injury was at stake. Zacharias, supra note 6, at 401.
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does not disclose will ever be detected," ° may explain why
disclosure in this context is infrequent.
iii. Lawyers Withdraw in Some Cases Rather Than Disclose
For many years, withdrawal from representation was the
prescribed course for lawyers who faced a variety of problems
with their clients." 1 Although New Jersey lawyers did not
withdraw often when their clients were contemplating bodily
harm, many attorneys withdrew from the representation rath-
er than disclose client confidences when substantial injury to
the fmancial interests or property of another was at stake.
Only 5% of the sixty-seven attorneys who discussed with
their clients their belief that the clients were going to commit
acts likely to result in substantial bodily harm threatened to
withdraw from the representation. 2 None of the sixty-seven
lawyers who believed their clients were going to commit the
wrongful acts actually withdrew from the representation with-
out also disclosing client information to prevent the wrongful
act.'
In contrast, lawyers confronted with clients who were going
to commit wrongful acts likely to result in financial harm or
property damage were much more likely to threaten withdraw-
al and to actually withdraw from the representation. Almost
25% of the attorneys confronted with such clients threatened to
withdraw, as compared to 12% who threatened to disclose."M
Twenty-six of the total lawyers who encountered such clients
ultimately withdrew from the representation rather than dis-
250. See infra notes 303-05 and accompanying text.
251. For example, under the Code of Professional Responsibility, with-
drawal was required when continued employment would result in the
violation of a disciplinary rule and was permitted when the client persist-
ed in action involving the lawyer's services that the lawyer believed was
criminal or fraudulent. CPR, supra note 31, at DR 2-110.
252. Tables 16A, 16A(1), and 16C (4.9%). In contrast, approximately
20% of the lawyers who talked with their clients threatened to disclose.
Tables 16A & 16E.
253. Table 16D.
254. Compare Tables 17B & 17E (24.5%) with Table 17F (12.2%). Six of
the lawyers who encountered the problem (3.2%) both threatened to dis-
close and threatened to withdraw. Id.
136 [Vol.47:81
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close; only eight lawyers disclosed client confidences when
disclosure was required. 5
The low number of withdrawals when clients were contem-
plating bodily harm may reflect a moral judgment that the
lawyers should not simply remove themselves from the situa-
tion and allow an innocent party to be physically harmed. In
cases not involving physical harm, the traditional importance
that lawyers attach to maintaining client confidences seemed
to take priority over moral concerns. As one attorney noted:
The attorney-client relationship is very important. Clients
should be able to divulge all confidences to their attorney
without fear of disclosure .... If, as a result of the informa-
tion received, the attorney no longer can or will represent the
client, all parties can terminate the relationship and move on
with no potential retribution to either side as a result of the
information learned.266
These lawyers' responses indicate that lawyers generally
prefer to remove themselves from the representation rather
than to reveal client confidences to prevent future client
wrongdoing, at least where injury to the financial interests or
property of another are at stake. 7
255. Tables 20A & 51. The 26 lawyers who withdrew reported that
their clients committed the wrongful acts or that they did not know
whether their clients had done so.
256. I.D. No. 30, Question A.C. Another lawyer noted, "A lawyer[-]client
relationship is fragile and needs sensitivity in particulars. A black and
white ethical rule is impossible to follow. Lawyers should never allow a
client to believe that they would accept illegal conduct and the greatest
sanction to [a] client is your threat to withdraw from representation."
I.D. No. 70, Question A.C.; see also I.D. Nos. 283, 385, at Question A.C.
257. This general preference for withdrawal was supported by the re-
sponses of lawyers who were asked about what they do in their current
practice if they begin to suspect that a client might be planning to com-
mit a future criminal or fraudulent act that is likely to substantially
harm another. See Appendix infra Survey Question 34. In response to
this open-ended question, which many lawyers read as hypothetical, 3.6%
of the lawyers indicated that they would threaten to disclose and 13.2%
said that they would disclose client information. Table 23A. In contrast,
7.5% of the lawyers said that they would threaten to withdraw and
18.5% said that they would in fact withdraw from the representation.
Table 23A. The lawyers' answers to this question at times made if diffi-
cult to distinguish explicit threats to disclose from actual disclosure and
19941
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5. Lawyer Handling of Future Harm Problem Often Has
Little Adverse Impact on Relationships with Clients
One objection to any attorney disclosure rule is the impact
that an exception will have on the attorney-client relationship.
The lawyers' responses suggest that they believe the ways in
which they handle the problem of future client wrongdoing
have relatively little adverse impact on the attorney-client
relationship.
More than 75% of the attorneys who believed their clients
were going to cause substantial bodily injury to another report-
ed that their handling of the situation had no apparent impact
on their relationships with their clients.u8 Less than 20% of
the lawyers reported that their clients were less cooperative or
that the relationship prematurely terminated. 9 A small
number of the lawyers responded that their relationships with
their clients actually improved." °
Client relations became more strained when injury to the
financial interests or property of another was at stake. This
increased strain may have occured because clients were seek-
ing to have their lawyers facilitate the wrongful conduct or
because clients could not conduct the wrongful acts without
their attorneys' assistance. About 55% of the attorneys who
had clients who they believed were going to commit wrongful
acts likely to result in such injury said that their handling of
the situation had no apparent impact on their relationships
with their clients.2 1' Almost 10% of the lawyers reported that
their client was less forthcoming or less cooperative. 262 Ap-
threats to withdraw from actual withdrawal from the representation, but
it is clear that more attorneys believed that they would consider with-




260. Id. (3.1%). This was a write-in response to "other" and may have
been noted more frequently if the option had been specifically provided.
See Appendix infra Survey Question 33f. One lawyer explained that
"when an attorney gives a forceful 'no,' the client usually backs down





proximately 24% reported that the client prematurely termi-
nated the relationship or the attorney withdrew from the rep-
resentation.26 Five percent of the lawyers said that their re-
lationships with their clients were enhanced."4
Surprisingly, the lawyers who threatened to disclose their
clients' plans but did not actually disclose reported that they
did not necessarily experience a deterioration of their relation-
ships with their clients. Of the seven attorneys who threatened
to disclose to prevent bodily harm but did not ultimately dis-
close, five reported no apparent impact on their relationships
with their clients." 5 The same was less true of the nineteen
lawyers who threatened to disclose in order to prevent finan-
cial injury or property damage, but who did not ultimately dis-
close. Only ten of those lawyers reported no adverse impact on
their relationships with their clients.266
When bodily injury was at stake, the lawyers who actually
disclosed client information damaged their relationships with
their clients less than might be imagined. Of the twelve attor-
neys who disclosed to prevent bodily harm, five reported no
apparent impact on their relationships with their clients and
one reported that the relationship was enhanced.26 Three of
those six lawyers had warned their clients that they would
disclose before disclosing, lending support to psychological
research suggesting that this approach may better preserve the
relationship.268 On the other hand, of the eight lawyers who
disclosed to prevent financial injury or property damage, five
reported that their relationships with their clients were termi-
263. Id.
264. Id.; Table 52.
265. Table 16E.
266. Tables 17F and 52.
267. Table 44. It should be noted that at least one of the five lawyers
who experienced no adverse impact noted that the client did not learn of
the disclosure. I.D. No. 17, Question 20f.
268. There is evidence that when psychotherapists warn potential vic-
tims that patients may cause harm, the warning does not damage the
therapeutic relationship if the doctor and patient discuss the warning
ahead of time and the warning is justified. James C. Beck, When the
Patient Threatens Violence: An Empirical Study of Clinical Practice After
Tarasoff, 10 BULL. OF THE AAPL 189, 199 (1982).
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nated.269 Obviously, to thoroughly investigate what types of
attorney behavior negatively affects attorney-client relations,
interviews with clients must be performed.
V. REEXAMINING THE EXPERIMENT
The New Jersey study reveals how some lawyers respond to
the problem of clients who plan to cause serious harm to oth-
ers. The study's results do not indicate the full impact of RPC
1.6(b) on attorney conduct,2 7 but they can be used to begin to
evaluate how a mandatory disclosure rule affects attorneys and
their clients. Although further empirical research in this area
is needed, some tentative suggestions are made that may bet-
ter accomodate the interests at stake.
A. Do Mandatory Disclosure Rules "Work ?"
This question cannot be answered on the basis of the New
Jersey study alone. The findings suggest, however, that man-
datory disclosure rules may not achieve their major objective:
the prevention of harm.27' In addition, mandatory disclosure
rules may not substantially affect lawyers' views of their obli-
gations to disclose.
1. The Disclosure Rule Does Not Clearly Prevent Harm
The New Jersey study does not clearly demonstrate that a
mandatory disclosure rule prevents harm to others. Although
the vast majority of lawyers tried to dissuade their clients from
committing wrongful acts, whether any of them did so because
of the existence of the mandatory disclosure rule is uncertain.
Moreover, the theory that lawyers will be better able to dis-
269. Table 35B.
270. A true legal impact study typically requires a comparison of events
in the jurisdiction before and after the rule was enacted, a comparison of
jurisdictions with the two different rules or a combination of the two
approaches. See Richard Lempert, Strategies of Research Design in the
Legal Impact Study: The Control of Plausible Rival Hypotheses, 1 LAW &
Soc'Y REV. 111, 112 (1966-67).




suade their clients from wrongdoing if they can tell their cli-
ents that they are required to disclose is not borne out in prac-
tice. Most lawyers did not attempt to use the disclosure rule to
dissuade client wrongdoing.272 Threats to disclose were not a
major reason why clients abandoned plans to commit wrongful
acts.27
Instead, it appears that some lawyer2s believe that the myth
of strict confidentiality enables them to dissuade clients from
wrongdoing. As one lawyer noted:
My experience is that clients are more forthcoming if they
know their communications cannot be disclosed. This pres-
ents the attorney with the opportunity to discuss the situ-
ation with the client and prevent the act from occurring. My
experience has proven this to be successful. These discussions
would never take place if the client knew they could be dis-
closed and an opportunity might be lost.274
Clients need to be interviewed to determine to what extent this
view of confidentiality is accurate.
It also appears that when lawyers reach the end of the line
with their clients and cannot persuade them to abandon their
wrongful plans, most lawyers surveyed did not disclose their
clients' plans. The few lawyers who disclosed client information
to prevent harm believed they would have done so regardless
of whether they were required to do so by the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct.275 Even when attorney disclosure did occur, it
did not always prevent the occurrence of the wrongful act.27
272. Less than 30% of the lawyers threatened to disclose or discussed
confidentiality with their clients who were contemplating wrongdoing and
it is not clear how many of those lawyers actually told their clients that
they were obligated to disclose. See supra notes 204-05, 207-08 and ac-
companying text.
273. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
274. I.D. No. 478, Question A.C.; see also I.D. Nos. 481, 530, at
Question A.C.
275. Only one lawyer who disclosed would not have disclosed if dis-
closure were optional under the Rules of Professional Conduct. See supra
note 223 and accompanying text.
276. For example, two lawyers who reported that they disclosed client
information to prevent bodily harm indicated that the wrongful act oc-
curred anyway. I.D. No. 17, Question 15 (removing children from the
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These observations do not fully answer the question of
whether mandatory disclosure rules prevent harm to others.
New Jersey lawyers may try harder than lawyers in other
states to dissuade their clients from committing wrongful acts
because of the obligation to disclose client information if they
fail. In addition, threats to disclose possibly are more effective
in New Jersey than they would be in a state with different dis-
closure rules. To test these hypotheses, however, it would be
neccessary to compare the responses of New Jersey lawyers to
those of attorneys in a state with permissive disclosure rules.
It would also be useful to compare client responses from the
two states to explore the reasons and the extent to which cli-
ents believed their attorneys prevented them from committing
wrongful acts.
2. The Disclosure Rule and the Lawyer's Role
The New Jersey study does not clearly reveal whether RPC
1.6 has had an effect on lawyers' views of their obligation to
disclose to prevent harm to others. It does show that bar sup-
port for mandatory disclosure rules appears not much stronger
among those attorneys who were admitted to the New Jersey
bar after the adoption of RPC 1.6 than those who were admit-
ted before 1984.277 The similarity of the opinions suggests
that the prevailing bar culture or subcultures concerning confi-
dentiality may be more powerful than the impact of legal edu-
cation on lawyers.7 '
court's jurisdiction to frustrate the spouse's visitation); I.D. No. 341,
Question 15 (driving while intoxicated).
277. The only significant differences were that the newer lawyers more
strongly supported the mandatory disclosure rule to prevent bodily harm
and to prevent illegal acts that would result in environmental harm.
Table 46.
278. On the one hand, this finding is somewhat surprising, since law
schools typically teach the range of alternative rules governing the prob-
lem of client wrongdoing, and practitioners believe that they learned
sensitivity to ethical issues essentially in law schools. See, e.g., BRYANT
G. GARTH & JOANNE MARTIN, LAW SCHOOLS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF
COMPETENCE, Tables 4-8 (American Bar Foundation Working Paper No.
9212 1992). On the other hand, it may be that the view of the lawyer as
defender of the client against the world, e.g., FREEDMAN, supra note 58,
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Lawyers' written comments suggest that their views about
their obligations as lawyers and the role of individual morality
are quite varied. Some lawyers persist in the view that their
role as protector of the client usurps any consideration of mor-
al issues, even to the point of remaining silent knowing a cli-
ent plans to commit a wrongful act. 9 Other lawyers firmly
believe that the client's interests do not supersede the
attorney's own morality. ° One lawyer made it quite clear
that his or her morality could not be legislated: "I would not
'give up' a client unless I believed that a particular individual
would certainly be killed. Then I would act out of a sense of
my own morality, not because of a court rule." 1 These
comments are purely antecdotal; to determine whether RPC
1.6 has in fact affected lawyers' views of their role and their
disclosure obligations, lawyers in a state without a mandatory
disclosure rule should also be surveyed.
B. Tinkering with the Experiment
The New Jersey study provides a fascinating glimpse at the
ways in which attorneys deal with clients whom they believe
are about to harm others, but its findings cannot be over-gen-
eralized. In view of the number and importance of the open
questions, it would be premature to suggest that mandatory
disclosure rules should be scuttled or embraced. Nevertheless,
some consideration should be given to tinkering with the rules.
at 4, is so ingrained within the population surveyed that it overpowers
other rules. See generally Fred C. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional
Responsibility Codes: Theory, Practice and the Paradigm of Prosecutorial
Ethics, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 223, 268 n.130 (1993) (noting that if a
highly specific rule seems indefensible to a subculture of lawyers based
on their shared experiences, then the lawyers may feel free to ignore
that rule).
279. Another attorney who did not disclose to prevent harm explained,
"I hold sacred the attorney-client privilege."
280. One lawyer wrote, "[p]ersonally, I would rather surrender my
license than look the other way while a client commits civil fraud or a
criminal act." I.D. No. 770, Question A.C.; see also I.D. Nos. 173, 180,
285, 366, at Question A.C.
281. I.D. No. 538, Question A.C.
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1. Being Honest with Clients About the Disclosure Rules
The New Jersey study confirmed that lawyers do not tell
most of their clients about the disclosure rules, even though
they do not believe their clients understand the rules. 2
While scholars agree that clients have a right to know about
attorney disclosure rules,283 lawyers do not usually talk about
the rules, apparently because they fear that such discussions
will interfere with client trust and the client's willingness to
talk freely with counsel. 4
A lawyer's deliberate failure to inform a client of the disclo-
sure rule is deceptive and the deception carries costs for both
lawyer and client. 5 The costs of deception include client dis-
trust of lawyers, loss of client autonomy, and damage to
lawyers' internal standards of integrity. 6
282. See supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text. Professor Zacharias
made a similar observation based upon the Tompkins County study. The
primary difference between the New Jersey study and the Tompkins
County study is that the New Jersey study suggests that many lawyers
deliberately perpetuate the myth of strict confidentiality by telling their
clients about confidentiality while the Tompkins County study indicated
that few lawyers told their clients about confidentiality. See Zacharias,
supra note 6, at 382-83.
283. See supra note 62. Some scholars have also argued that conversa-
tions about the lawyer's disclosure obligations will allow the lawyer to
"display] his trustworthiness in concrete terms." Hodes, supra note 62, at
786; see also Pizzimenti, supra note 16, at 485 n.200. This argument is
not completely convincing. A client may trust that a lawyer will be
forthright about the rules governing their relationship, but not trust that
the client's thoughts can be freely and safely shared with the lawyer.
284. See supra notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
285. Pizzimenti, supra note 16, at 482-83 (referring to policy of not
disclosing limits on confidentiality as an "ongoing practice of deception").
Deception has been defined by Sissela Bok as "messages meant to mis-
lead [others] . . . through gesture, through disguise, by means of action
or inaction, even through silence." SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 14 (1979).
286. Lisa G. Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 659, 679-83
(1990); Pizzimenti, supra note 16, at 478-80. The full consequences of the
deception become apparent when considering that some New Jersey
lawyers disclosed client information without having told their clients
about the disclosure rule. E.g., I.D. No. 8, Questions 12, 17; I.D. No.
100, Questions 13, 17.
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Rules governing lawyers that require systematic deception of
clients to achieve the rule's goals impose too many costs on
lawyers, on clients and, ultimately, on society to be desir-
able. 7 When mandatory disclosure rules are adopted, it
should be with the understanding that clients are entitled to
know about these rules before they speak about future wrong-
doing. Moreover, lawyers should be required to tell their cli-
ents about the rules prior to any such communication by the
client.
State rules of professional conduct should specify when, how,
and to whom this information about the disclosure obligation is
to be provided,"5 because lawyers do not know what to
do." If the rules of professional conduct required lawyers to
discuss the disclosure rule with their clients, then the lawyer's
professional obligations would be clearer to both lawyer and
client.
It is easy to say that clients should be told about this confi-
dentiality exception, but much more difficult to decide who
should learn of the rule and to devise a palatable and mean-
ingful way to tell clients. In theory, all clients should be told
explicitly about the disclosure rule because all are entitled to
know the rules that govern their communications with their
lawyers.29 ° As a practical matter, such a requirement could
287. See supra text accompanying note 286. Some additional costs are
described in Lerman, supra note 286, at 679-83.
288. The ABA at one time considered requiring that similar information
be given to clients, but the idea was abandoned. The Discussion Draft of
the Model Rules contained a feature requiring lawyers to advise clients
about "the relevant legal and ethical limitation to which the lawyer is
subject" when the lawyer becomes concerned that the client expects
prohibited assistance. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.4
(Discussion Draft January 30, 1980); see Hodes, supra note 62, at 786-87.
All that remains is Model Rule 1.4, which requires lawyers to "explain a
matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make
informed decisions regarding the representation." MODEL RULES OF PRO-
FESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.4(b) (1983).
289. As one lawyer noted, "It would be unfair to a client to disclose
information if the holes in the attorney-client privilege had not been
discussed with the client in advance. Lawyers need better training in
this." I.D. No. 689, Question A.C. See also I.D. No. 588, Question A.C.
290. Indeed, in view of the empirical evidence that many clients may
1994]
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confuse many clients and seriously interfere with the develop-
ment of client trust, thereby affecting lawyers' ability to repre-
sent their clients.291
The subject of how best to advise clients about the contours
of the attorney confidentiality rules is beyond the scope of this
Article, but it would seem that the "who" to tell should include,
at a minimum, those clients who are told about confidentiality
by their lawyers and those clients whom lawyers believe might
contemplate future wrongdoing during the representation.292
The "what" to tell clients should include specific mention of the
lawyer's desire to discuss the client's questions about the legal-
ity of the client's contemplated conduct so as not to discourage
client communications. By inviting clients to discuss the legali-
ty of contemplated conduct, lawyers may retain the opportuni-
ty to dissuade clients from committing wrongful acts.
2. Being Clear with Lawyers About the Withdrawal Rules
It is not surprising that many lawyers withdraw from the
representation rather than disclose information to prevent
their clients from committing wrongful acts. Disclosure is risky
not understand that there are exceptions to confidentiality, see supra
notes 93, 96, 183 and accompanying text, rules should be developed to
insure that clients are told about all confidentiality exceptions that may
come into play for the particular client.
291. The difficulty presented by an across-the-board requirement that
lawyers advise all clients of the disclosure obligation is perhaps best
illustrated by the challenges facing public defenders. Public defenders
reportedly have a great deal of difficulty establishing client trust, but
they also encounter significantly more clients whom they believe will
commit bodily harm than other lawyers. In addition, public defenders
were less likely to believe their clients understood confidentiality excep-
tions than other lawyers. Table 29; see supra note 142 and accompanying
text. Although it has been suggested that all criminal defendants be
advised of the disclosure exception, see Pizzimenti, supra note 16, at 486-
87, careful thought must be given to whether a more flexible rule about
whom to tell about the disclosure rule might be preferable.
292. It has been suggested that the lawyer should evaluate the like-
lihood that information within a confidentiality exception may be confided
and if it is likely, the exception should be discussed with the client. Id.
at 486-87.
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and unpleasant for a variety of reasons.293 Withdrawal reduc-
es those risks, while permitting the lawyer to feel like she has
signalled disapproval (at least to the client) of the wrongful
conduct.294
Lawyers should not be permitted to circumvent their obliga-
tion to disclose by quietly withdrawing from the representa-
tion. Withdrawal without disclosure does not prevent harm; at
best it may delay it and at worst it leaves better educated
clients who can then enlist a new lawyer's unwitting assis-
tance with the wrongful acts. An affirmative statement should
be added to codes of professional conduct clarifying that law-
yers cannot satisfy their obligations to disclose by withdrawing
from the representation.295 This statement should reduce the
incidence of lawyers who withdraw from the representation
without making disclosure to prevent client wrongdoing. In
addition, a separate bar examination ethics component or Con-
tinuing Legal Education requirement in states with mandatory
disclosure rules may also help insure that lawyers better famil-
iarize themselves with the particular state's disclosure require-
ments.296
293. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
294. Rates of withdrawal in New Jersey may also be due to confusion
about the rule. RPC 1.16(a)(1) requires withdrawal if "the representation
will result in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law."
N.J. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16 (1984). Lawyers may
reason that if they do not disclose, their continued representation will
violate RPC 1.6(b), but if they withdraw from the representation, they
will have no duty to disclose the plans of their former client.
295. This suggestion is based in part on my experiences with practicing
lawyers who indicate that they are often unclear about their professional
obligations, but that they vaguely recall the rule of thumb "when in
doubt-withdraw."
296. Law schools tend to teach the ABA codes, and the Multi-state
Professional Responsibility Bar Examination ("MPRE") is also based on
those rules. As a result, some lawyers may never learn about the manda-
tory disclosure requirements in the state in which they practice unless
they have reason to research the rule.
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3. Reconsidering Mandatory Disclosure to Prevent
Financial Injury or Property Damage
Although further empirical research is needed, the New
Jersey study suggests that a mandatory disclosure requirement
may be defensible-if not desirable-to prevent a client from
causing death or serious bodily harm.297 At the same time,
the study also suggests that mandatory rules to prevent other
types of harm should be carefully scrutinized because their
costs may significantly outweigh their benefits."'
The bar does not strongly support a rule requiring disclosure
to prevent a client from committing a wrongful act that will
cause substantial injury to the financial interest or property of
another.299 Disapproval of the rule seems to modestly contrib-
ute to the failure to attempt to dissuade clients from wrongdo-
ing 0 and to the failure to comply with the disclosure
requirement.'O°
Undoubtedly, the failure to comply with RPC 1.6(b) is fueled
by the difficulty of detection and the lack of enforcement of the
rule. °2 No formal disciplinary action has been taken against
a lawyer for failure to comply with Rule 1.6(b)."' The lack of
297. Even though it is not clear that mandatory disclosure rules pre-
vent bodily harm, see supra notes 272-76 and accompanying text, they
can be defended on the grounds that they are supported by the bar and
are often obeyed, if only because lawyers believe that disclosure is the
moral thing to do. See supra notes 225-26 and accompanying text.
298. Mandatory disclosure rules should not be retained because they
"cannot hurt." There are costs to employing rules that purport to affect
conduct but are not enforced. Zacharias, supra note 278, at 257 n.102.
299. See supra notes 244, 247 and accompanying text.
300. See supra notes 239-41 and accompanying text. Disapproval of the
rule caused some lawyers to tell their clients to stop talking about
wrongful plans so that the lawyers were not placed in a position where
they would be required to disclose. As a result, those lawyers did not
learn of the plans and lost an opportunity to dissuade their clients from
wrongdoing.
301. See supra notes 236-38, 248-49 and accompanying text.
302. Traditionally, the effectiveness of laws turns on the likelihood and
degree of sanctions. Zacharias, supra note 278, at 239 n.47. As Professor
Zacharias notes, although other factors bear on decisions to comply with
code rules, the likelihood of enforcement is undoubtedly one of them. Id.
at 252 & n.91.
303. Letter from Stephen W. Townsend, Clerk of the Supreme Court of
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enforcement signals to lawyers that the rule need not be
obeyed. While fear of civil liability may improve compliance,
such lawsuits are relatively rare."4
Although lawyer disapproval of the rule, failure to comply,
and lack of enforcement are not necessarily reasons to change
it, they do raise serious issues.0 5 Lawyer disapproval of RPC
1.6(b) may engender wider disrespect of the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct and foster the view among lawyers that it is
acceptable to pick and choose which of those rules they will
obey.308 If lawyers do not obey the rules that govern them,
there is a danger of a loss of legitimacy of their efforts to regu-
late themselves0 7 and a further loss of public trust in law-
yers.
Rather than require disclosure to prevent non-bodily harm
and have that rule disregarded, a permissive disclosure rule
with a withdrawal requirement (where withdrawal is possible)
may better protect the interests at stake. The withdrawal
requirement should be coupled with code language suggesting
that if disclosure is not made to an authority or to the intend-
New Jersey, to Leslie C. Levin (July 14, 1993) (on file with the Rutgers
Law Review). It is unclear whether the absence of disciplinary action is
due entirely to the difficulty of detection or whether it is also because
the bar has declined to enforce the rule. For example, a member of New
Jersey's Disciplinary Review Board stated that the Board had avoided
sanctioning lawyers based on alleged violations of the controversial RPC
3.3(a)(5) (dealing with disclosure to the tribunal) because of fundamental
bar disagreement with the rule. See supra notes 49 & 52.
304. There is only one reported case upholding a claim for failure to
disclose based upon New Jersey's RPC 1.6(b). See Philadelphia Reserve
Supply Co. v. Nowalk & Assoc., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12745 (E.D. Pa.
Aug. 25 1992).
305. The likelihood that rules of professional responsibility will be
obeyed continues to affect the decisions to adopt particular code provi-
sions. See e.g., Daniel J. Capra et al., The Attorney's Duties to Report
Misconduct of Other Attorneys and to Report Fraud on a Tribunal, 47
THE REC. Assoc. OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. 905, 927 (1992).
306. See generally Zacharias, supra note 278, at 265 n.117 (noting that
if particular rules never result in disciplinary proceedings, then it may
cause lawyers to treat all rules as empty).
307. Although lawyers are no longer entirely self-regulating, they re-




ed victim, then it should be made to a successor lawyer so that
a new lawyer does not unwittingly facilitate a wrongful
scheme.
For substantally the same reasons that clients should be told
about mandatory disclosure rules,30 8 clients are entitled to
know about permissive disclosure rules before they speak
about future wrongdoing. While a permissive disclosure rule
and the attendant need to advise the client of the rule would
create some of the same potential problems raised by a manda-
tory disclosure scheme, a permissive rule may interfere less
with lawyers' opportunities to dissuade clients from wrongdo-
ing. Undoubtedly, knowledge of the possibility that a lawyer
will disclose will deter some clients from speaking. It seems
likely, however, that fewer clients would be deterred from
speaking by a permissive disclosure rule and that fewer law-
yers would discourage their clients from speaking if the disclo-
sure rule were not a mandatory one.
A permissive disclosure rule would not necessarily reduce
the number of lawyer disclosures to prevent financial injury or
property damage.309 At the same time, a permissive rule may
not substantially reduce lawyers' efforts to dissuade their cli-
ents from wrongdoing, because in many instances, their failure
to dissuade will result in economic loss occasioned by with-
drawal 1 ° Moreover, the impact of a withdrawal threat on a
client should not be underestimated; withdrawal would give
308. See supra notes 283-87 and accompanying text. Although manda-
tory disclosure rules arguably create a higher level of likelihood that the
client information will be disclosed, a client is also entitled to know that
a lawyer may reveal client information, unless the lawyer is confident
that she would never reveal this information under any circumstances.
309. The few New Jersey attorneys who did disclose to prevent non-
bodily harm often did so out of self-interest and would have disclosed
even without mandatory rules. See supra notes 223, 231-32 and accompa-
nying text.
310. It is quite possible that there will, however, be some lessening in
efforts to dissuade. As previously noted, it is not possible to assess from
the New Jersey study how many lawyers attempted to dissuade their
clients because of the existence of a mandatory disclosure rule. See supra
p.120. A withdrawal rule possibly may result in fewer efforts to dissuade




some clients pause, if only because of the cost and delay in-
volved in changing lawyers."1 '
A permissive disclosure, when coupled with and the threat of
withdrawal also signal to the client the seriousness with which
the attorney views the conduct, and signal to the public that
lawyers will not tacitly abide conduct that will harm the finan-
cial interests or property of another. Finally, a permissive
disclosure rule might increase respect for the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct and cause lawyers to take disclosure rules
concerning the prevention of bodily harm more seriously.
CONCLUSION
What was once tagged as part of a radical experiment has
not clearly resulted in radical changes in the thinking or con-
duct of the lawyers surveyed. On the contrary, many attorneys
continue to believe that the sanctity of client confidentiality
outweighs other important values. As a result, some lawyers
have remained silent while clients committed crimes or frauds
that seriously harmed others. Others have tried to avoid learn-
ing about their clients' plans.
At the same time, the New Jersey study reveals that most
lawyers try hard and in good faith to cope with this very diffi-
cult problem. While they are not always forthcoming about
their disclosure obligations, and often resist disclosure, their
comments reflect a real commitment to attempting to dissuade
their clients from committing wrongful acts.
The results of the New Jersey study raise a number of is-
sues for further theoretical consideration and empirical re-
search. For example, given the evidence that lawyers attempt
to dissuade their clients from wrongdoing and that clients may
be dissuaded by their lawyers' efforts, it becomes all the more
important to determine how clients' communications with their
lawyers are affected by knowledge that lawyers are subject to
mandatory disclosure requirements. Further research is need-
ed to determine whether opportunities to dissuade are in fact
311. The fact that one-quarter of the New Jersey lawyers threatened
their clients who were contemplating causing financial injury or property
damage with withdrawal reflects that they believe it is effective. See
supra note 254 and accompanying text.
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lost after clients learn of the disclosure rule, or alternatively,
whether clients talk with their counsel because their need for
advice outweighs their concern about disclosure.
Empirical research in this area is difficult and admittedly
imperfect; it is tempting to rely instead upon theories based on
intuitive assumptions about lawyer conduct. Unfortunately, the
problem of client wrongdoing is not theoretical, and the New
Jersey study suggests that lawyer response to client plans to
commit wrongful acts cannot be predicted based solely upon
intuition. If empirical evidence is collected carefully and inter-
preted cautiously, it cannot help but advance the debate about
the rules that should govern lawyers confronted with clients
who intend to harm others.
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APPENDIX A
SURVEY OF NEW JERSEY LAWYERS
Thank you for participating in this survey on an anonymous
basis. The survey is being sent to New Jersey lawyers in order
to learn about their practices relating to attorney-client confi-
dentiality and to learn about their experiences with clients
who they believe intend to commit criminal, illegal or fraudu-
lent acts that are likely to cause substantial harm to others.
Completion of the survey should take less than 10 minutes.
For most of the questions, please circle the letter that corre-
sponds to the answer most closely representing your view.
Unless otherwise indicated, please select only one answer per
question. Space has been provided at the end of the question-
naire to include any comments you may have.
This survey seeks to determine the practices and views of
the New Jersey bar in the aggregate and there is no need or
reason to identify individual participants. Thus, you are not
identified on this questionnaire and your anonymity is insured.
A business reply envelope is enclosed for your convenience.
I. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
1. In what type of office do you practice?
a. Solo practitioner.
b. Small law firm (2-20 lawyers).
c. Medium law firm (more than 20 lawyers).
d. Corporation.
e. Legal services/public defender.
f. Other:
2. In what area(s) do you practice? (If you identify more than
one practice area, indicate the percentage of your time
devoted to each area in the corresponding "percentage"
column).
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h. Trusts and Estates.
i. Other:
3. In what year did you graduate from law school? 19
4. How long have you been a member of the New Jersey bar?
a. Less than 5 years.
b. 5 to 10 years.
c. 11 to 20 years.
d. 21 to 30 years.
e. Over 30 years.
5. Are you a member of the bar of any other state?
If yes, which state(s)
II. ATTORNEY-CLIENT CONFIDENTIALITY RULES
Please answer Question Nos. 6-7 based upon your com-
munications and observations during the last 12
months.
6. What percentage of your clients do you personally inform of
the confidentiality of their communications to you?
a. None of your clients.
b. Less than 10% of your clients.
c. 10% to 25% of your clients.
d. 26% to 50% of your clients.
e. 51% to 75% of your clients.
f. More than 75% of your clients.
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7. What percentage of your clients do you believe understand
that there are circumstances under which a lawyer may be
obligated to disclose attorney-client confidences to a third
party without the client's consent?
a. None of your clients.
b. Less than 10%.
c. 10% to 25%.
d. 26% to 50%.
e. 51% to 75%.
f. More than 75%.
III. DANGER OF DEATH OR SUBSTANTIAL BODILY
HARM TO ANOTHER
8. On how many occasions since January 1, 1985 have you
reasonably believed that a client was going to commit a
specific criminal, illegal or fraudulent act in the near future
that was likely to result in death or substantial bodily
harm to an identifiable third party? (Circle the number of
occasions).
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10+
If the answer to Question No. 8 was "0," skip to Question
No. 21.
9. On how many of those occasions identified in Question No.
8 did you attempt to dissuade your client from committing
the act that was likely to result in death or substantial
bodily harm to another? (Circle the number of occasions).
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10+
Question Nos. 10-20 are addressed to the most recent
occasion on which you believed that your client was
going to commit a criminal, illegal or fraudulent act
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that was likely to result in death or substantial bodily
harm to another.
10. What was the anticipated act?
11. What caused you to believe that your client was going to
commit the act?




c. I don't recall.
13. If the answer to Question No. 12 was "yes," what did you
discuss with your client? (Circle more than one letter if
applicable):
a. The legal consequences of the act.
b. The morality of the act.
c. The likelihood that your client would be apprehended.
d. The confidentiality of your conversation with your cli-
ent (if so, describe what you said)_
e. Any actions you intended to take to prevent the act (if
so, describe what you said)_
f. Other:
14. If you did not discuss with your client your belief that the
client was going to commit an act that was likely to result
in death or substantial bodily harm to another, what were
the reasons why you did not discuss it?
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15. Did your client subsequently commit the anticipated act?
a. Yes.
b. No.
c. I don't know.
16. If the answer to Question No. 15 was "no," why do you
think that your client did not commit the act?
a. You were wrong about your client's intentions.
b. You told your client that you would disclose informa-
tion to someone else in order to prevent the act.
c. You dissuaded your client from committing the act by
using other reasoning.
d. You disclosed client information to someone else in or-
der to prevent the act.
e. Other:
If you did not disclose client information to someone
else in order to prevent the anticipated act, skip to
Question No. 20.
17. If you disclosed client information to someone else in or-
der to prevent the anticipated act, to whom did you dis-
close?
a. The intended victim(s).
b. A relative of the client.
c. A mental health professional.
d. The police.
e. A prosecutor or judge.
f. Other:
18. If you disclosed client information in order to prevent the
act, why did you do so? (Circle only the applicable an-
swers and rank them in importance in the corresponding
1994]
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"rank" column, with "1" reflecting the most important rea-
son).
Rank
a. Concern about client.
b. Concern about own civil liability.
c. Concern about own criminal prosecution.
d. Concern about intended victim(s).
e. Concern about compliance with Rules
of Professional Conduct.
f. Concern about reputation in community.
g. Other:
19. Do you believe that you would have disclosed client infor-
mation on this occasion if disclosure were optional under
the Rules of Professional Conduct?
a. Yes.
b. No.
20. What impact, if any, did your handling of this situation
have on your ongoing relationship with your client?
a. The incident had no apparent impact.
b. The client was less forthcoming with information.
c. The client was less cooperative in general.
d. The client prematurely terminated the relationship.
e. You withdrew from the representation.
f. Other:
IV. DANGER OF SUBSTANTIAL INJURY TO FINANCIAL
INTEREST OR PROPERTY OF ANOTHER
21. On how many occasions since January 1, 1985 have you
reasonably believed that a client was going to commit a
specific criminal, illegal or fraudulent act in the near fu-
ture that was likely to result in substantial injury to the
financial interest or property of an identifiable third par-
ty? (Circle the number of occasions).
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10+
If the answer to Question No. 21 was "0," skip to Ques-
tion No. 34.
22. On how many of those occasions identified in Question No.
21 did you attempt to dissuade your client from commit-
ting the act that was likely to result in substantial injury
to the financial interest or property of another? (Circle
number).
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10+
Question Nos. 23-33 are addressed to the most recent
occasion on which you believed that a client was going
to commit a criminal, illegal or fraudulent act that was
likely to result in substantial injury to the financial
interest or property of another.
23. What was the anticipated act?
24. What caused you to believe that your client was going to
commit the act?




c. I don't recall.
26. If the answer to Question No. 25 was "yes," what did you
discuss? (Circle more than one letter if applicable):
a. The legal consequences of the act.
b. The morality of the act.
c. The likelihood that your client would be apprehended.
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d. The confidentiality of your conversation with your cli-
ent (if so, describe what you said)_
e. Any actions you intended to take to prevent the act (if
so, describe what you said)_
f. Other:
27. If you did not discuss with your client your belief that the
client was going to commit an act that was likely to result
in substantial injury to the financial interest or property
of another, what were the reasons why you did not discuss
it?
28. Did your client subsequently commit the anticipated act?
a. Yes.
b. No.
c. I don't know.
29. If the answer to the Question No. 28 was "no," why do you
think that your client did not commit the act?
a. You were wrong about your client's intentions.
b. You told your client that you would disclose informa-
tion to someone else in order to prevent the act.
c. You dissuaded your client from committing the act by
using other reasoning.
d. You disclosed client information to someone else in or-
der to prevent the act.
e. Other:
If you did not disclose client information to someone




30. If you disclosed client information to someone else in or-
der to prevent the anticipated act, to whom did you dis-
close?
a. The intended victim(s).
b. A relative of the client.
c. A mental health professional.
d. The police.
e. A prosecutor or judge.
f. Other:
31. If you disclosed client information in order to prevent the
act, why did you do so? (Circle only the applicable an-
swers and rank them in importance in the corresponding
"rank" column, with "1" reflecting the most important rea-
son).
Rank
a. Concern about client.
b. Concern about own civil liability.
c. Concern about own criminal prosecution.
d. Concern about intended victim(s).
e. Concern about compliance with Rules
of Professional Conduct.
f. Concern about reputation in community.
g. Other:
32. Do you believe that you would have disclosed client
information on this occasion if disclosure were optional
under the Rules of Professional Conduct?
a. Yes.
b. No.
33. What impact, if any, did your handling of the situation
have on your ongoing relationship with your client?
a. The incident had no apparent impact.
b. The client was less forthcoming with information.
c. The client was less cooperative in general.
d. The client prematurely terminated the relationship.
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e. You withdrew from the representation.
f. Other:
V. ATTORNEY VIEWS AND PRACTICES
34. In your current practice, if a client's statements cause you
to begin to suspect that the client might be planning to
commit a criminal, illegal or fraudulent act that is likely
to substantially harm another, what do you do?
35. In the past 12 months, what percentage of your clients
have you personally informed that an attorney is obligated
to disclose client confidences if disclosure is necessary to
prevent a client from committing a criminal, illegal or
fraudulent act that is likely to substantially harm anoth-
er?
a. None of your clients.
b. Less than 10%.
c. 10% to 25%.
d. 26% to 50%.
e. 51% to 75%.
f. More than 75%.
36. If you inform clients of the attorney's obligation described
in Question No. 35, when do you usually do so?
a. At the first substantive meeting with the client.
b. When the client asked about confidentiality.
c. When you believed that the client might be about to
discuss a future criminal, illegal or fraudulent act.
d. When you believed that the client might be about to





Please answer "yes" or "no" for each sub-section of Ques-
tion Nos. 37 and 38.
37. Do you believe that the Rules of Professional Conduct
should require lawyers to disclose client confidences if
discloure is necessary to prevent a client from committing
a criminal act that is likely to result in
Yes No
a. Death or substantial bodily
harm to another?
b. Substantial injury to the
financial interest of another?
c. Substantial injury to the
property of another?
d. Substantial harm to the
environment?
38. Do you believe that the Rules of Professional Conduct
should require lawyers to disclose client confidences if dis-
closure is necessary to prevent a client from committing a
fraudulent or illegal (but non-criminal) act that is likely to
result in
Yes No
a. Substantial injury to the
financial interest of another?
b. Substantial injury to the
property of another?
c. Substantial harm to the
environment?
Your response to the final question would be very much
appreciated if you have the time to provide it, but if not,
please return this survey as completed to this point.
39. If you confronted situations since January 1, 1985 (other
than those described in your answers to Question Nos. 10-
20 and 23-33) in which you believed that your client was
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going to commit a criminal, illegal or fraudulent act that
was likely to substantially harm another, but you did not
disclose client information to anyone, what were your
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